Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies by Goss, Andrew G
University of Vermont
ScholarWorks @ UVM
UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors
Theses Undergraduate Theses
2015
Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New
Democracies
Andrew G. Goss
University of Vermont, andrewggoss@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uvm.edu/castheses
This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Theses at ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for
inclusion in UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UVM. For more
information, please contact donna.omalley@uvm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Goss, Andrew G., "Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies" (2015). UVM College of Arts and Sciences College






















Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies 
 
Andrew Goss 























“Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”   
-Winston Churchill 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the last few decades, significant democratic advances have been made all across the 
world.  A body of research on democratization has emerged to explain this phenomenon.  
However, one important question is often overlooked in the rush to try to explain the global 
democratic push: do the citizens of these democratizing countries actually want democracy?  
Often the answer seems to be yes.  Perhaps because of universally accepted norms, positive 
connotations with the word itself, or dreams of economic success, democracy retains a large 
margin of support compared to authoritarian alternatives across the world, especially when 
investigated in simple terms.  However, this support is not uniform and falters in some new 
democracies more than others.  Surveys in several of these countries have revealed that 
surprisingly large constituencies still view an authoritarian government as preferable.   
This thesis will investigate the puzzle demonstrated in Chart 1.1, which shows the 
percentage of respondents across Latin America and Africa who agreed that authoritarianism, or 
a “non-democratic regime,” can be preferable to democracy. No country exceeded 30% support 
for authoritarianism—good news for democracy—but there is significant variance across 
different countries.  Average authoritarian support in Latin America is 18.4% and ranges from 
11.9% in Bolivia to 28.9% in Honduras.  In Africa, authoritarian support is generally lower.  The 
African average is 11%, less than even the lowest Latin American country.  However, there is 
still notable variance across the region and Lesotho presents itself as a significant outlier with 
29.7% of survey takers agreeing that an authoritarian regime could be preferable.  The puzzle 
 that emerges in Chart 1.1 is: what explains the wide variation between countries in levels of 
popular support for authoritarianism?
Chart 1.1: Authoritarian Support in Africa and Latin America
Sources: Afrobarometer 2008/2009, Latinobarómetro
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Using similar measures of support for concrete regime alternatives in Latin America and 
Africa shows even greater variation in support for authoritarian regime types in these regions.  
29.2% of respondents across 18 countries in Latin America agreed that they “would support a 
military government in replacement of a democratic one if things got bad.”  Conditional support 
for military rule reached as high as 56.6% in Guatemala and as low as 9% in Costa Rica.  In 
Africa, support for one-party rule reached 39.2%, 36.2%, and 34.1% in Lesotho, Mozambique 
and Burkina Faso respectively.  The same measure found only 4.9% support in Senegal and less 
than a tenth in Madagascar.  Appendix A lists these various measures of authoritarian support 
across the three regions observed in this study.  
These trends highlight the significant variation among different new democracies with 
regards to their support for the idea of an authoritarian regime.  These measures of authoritarian 
support will serve as the dependent variable in the following investigation of the factors that 
might contribute to the differences observed.  I will examine why authoritarian support remains a 
key feature in the political makeup of many of these countries despite the adoption of at least 
nominally democratic institutions.  Beginning with the relevant literature, I will investigate 
factors that might be causing the persistence or emergence of support for non-democratic regime 
alternatives. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
The major thrust of academic work related to this particular issue has addressed the 
causes of support for democracy rather than support for authoritarianism.  In many ways support 
for democracy (or democratic legitimacy) is the opposite side of the same coin and can offer 
clues for this project.  However, there are important differences between these two measures of 
support. For example, a lack of democratic support could indicate widespread indifference to 
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regime type rather than an embrace of some concrete non-democratic alternative.  Measures of 
support for authoritarianism also tend to show larger disparities between countries and can 
therefore guide a more careful and nuanced investigation.  In this project, I am interested in 
investigating the root sources of popular support for the aim of reintroducing authoritarian 
institutions into newly democratic countries.  Since the division between these two research 
questions is not well defined and often overlapping, the following review of the literature will 
draw on both measures of regime support in order to form hypotheses. 
 Explanations for regime support tend to focus on economic, political and cultural factors.  
One classic line of scholarship has emphasized the role of economic factors in determining 
support for democracy.  Writing in the 1950s Seymour Martin Lipset made the case that 
modernization would promote democratization.1  His theory of modernization suggests that 
through industrialization, urbanization, and widening of education, democratic values would 
develop among the people.  Later scholars have stressed the importance of the more immediate 
economic experience of new democracies in shaping attitudes toward democracy.2  Proponents 
of this argument expect to find support for democracy in states that achieve growth and wealth 
under democratic institutions.  Conversely, an experience of hardship and scarcity should 
decrease commitment to democracy.  This school of thought helps generate the following 
hypothesis regarding support for authoritarianism:  poor and/or stagnant economic performance 
under democratic institutions will cause disenchantment with democracy and a consequent 
preference for authoritarian rule. 
                                                 
1
 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review (1959), 69-105. 
2
 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991);  Herbert Kitschelt, 
“The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” Politics and Society (1992), 7-50. 
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 The investigation of these factors, carried out in Chapter 2, questions this hypothesis, 
drawing from and expanding on the literature presented above.  I measure levels of education, 
urbanization, GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, economic inequality and poverty in 
countries with high popular authoritarian support as compared to those with lower support.  
Additionally, seeking to fully grasp the economic realities for citizens in these countries, I look 
at the effect of survey takers’ assessments of their countries’ and their own household economic 
situations on regime support. 
   Many theorists warn against putting too much stock into a country’s economic 
experience to explain support for democracy and authoritarian alternatives.  Numerous studies 
looking at a wide variety of possible explanations suggest that political variables rather than 
economic variables are most important.3  This body of research expects to find support for 
democracy and rejection of authoritarianism in states where democratic institutions have 
achieved rule of law, individual freedoms and rights, meaningful elections, and limits on 
corruption.  Where this has failed, citizens will feel less committed to democracy and be more 
likely to embrace authoritarian options.  The hypothesis that emerges from this literature is as 
follows: Failure to guarantee certain basic freedoms and securities associated with democratic 
institutions will drive citizens in new democracies to support some form of authoritarianism. 
 Chapter 3 investigates this hypothesis and the importance of the political system for 
determining authoritarian support.  Again comparing countries with high authoritarian support to 
those with lower authoritarian support, this chapter looks at general measurements of politics in 
                                                 
3
 Geoffrey Evans, Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and Economics of Democratic 
Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies,” British Journal of Political 
Science (1995), 485-514;  Richard Rose, William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and 
its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1998);  Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
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each country as well as perceptions of corruption.  Then, attempting to measure the experience of 
individuals in these countries, I look for correlations between measures of authoritarian support 
and several survey questions asking about democratic conditions on the ground.  These include 
worsening/improvement of democracy, the delivery of various political “goods” associated with 
democracy, efficacy of the system, satisfaction with democracy, and corruption. 
 Chapter 3 also investigates the effect of current and past political violence stemming 
from the regime in power.  The hypothesis here is that an increase in repressive tactics used by 
the government under democratic institutions (particularly with respect to past levels of 
government violence) will lead some to be more open to a form of authoritarian rule similar to 
the seemingly safe past regime. 
 Culture is another factor evoked to explain differences in regime commitment.  Some 
scholars have suggested that cultural factors like “Asian values” or religious traditions like Islam 
can produce a population that is more subservient to authority and willing to live under an 
illiberal regime.  At least one study, looking at South Korea, finds that certain aspects of 
Confucian cultural tradition drive support for authoritarian alternatives.4  Conversely, using 
statistical analysis, Stephen Fish finds that devoutness of Muslims does not have a significant 
effect on support for democracy.5  Proponents of the cultural argument would expect countries to 
be bound by their dominant culture.  In general this means that support for democracy would be 
found in more liberal, Western countries while support for authoritarianism would be found in 
countries with more hierarchical or traditional cultures.  We can simplify this discussion with the 
                                                 
4
 Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin, “Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support For 
Democracy? The Case of South Korea,” Asian Barometer Working Paper Series, No. 26 (2004). 
5
 Steven M. Fish, Are Muslims Distinctive? A Look at the Evidence (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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following hypothesis: countries that are not characterized by a liberal, “Western” culture will 
generally be more likely to embrace authoritarian alternatives. 
 Using this hypothesis as a springboard, Chapter 4 attempts to quantify cultural 
differences between countries with varying levels of authoritarian support.  I use Ronald 
Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s index of emancipative values to evaluate the degree to which 
Western, pro-democratic culture has penetrated a given society.  Additionally, I investigate the 
proportion of survey-takers who see goals of security and economic development as more of a 
priority for their country than deepening democracy and building responsive institutions.  Finally, 
I compare levels of interpersonal trust across the new democracies observed. 
Overview and Methods 
 The first section of this project will investigate the hypotheses enumerated above at the 
regional level for Africa, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.  I will begin by 
examining the role of economics, politics, culture and history in the formation of preferences for 
authoritarian rule in these regions.  The idea of focusing on the regional level has faced some 
recent resistance by those who believe that analyzing isolated regions could “fail to capture a 
significant cross-regional pattern.”6  One could counter that a larger-scale analysis could 
similarly fail to identify a significant regional pattern.  As a secondary inquiry, this project will 
seek to identify region-specific trends that may indicate that authoritarian support is better 
analyzed at this level.  
Country cases were selected (and labeled democracies) from among those included in the 
relevant surveys if they received a score of at least partly free on Freedom House’s measure of 
Freedom in the World during the year of the survey used for analysis.  They will be divided into 
                                                 
6
 Yun-han Chu, Michael Bratton, Marta Lagos, Sandeep Shastri, Mark Tessler, “Public Opinion 
and Democratic Legitimacy,” Journal of Democracy (2008), 76. 
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two groups based on levels of authoritarian support.  In Latin America, the first group contains 
countries with over 20% saying that sometimes an authoritarian regime is preferable.   The 
second group is made up of the remaining states where less than 20% of those surveyed accepted 
authoritarianism under some circumstances.7  Due to the abundance of democracy-related 
Afrobarometer questions and the comparatively small variation between cases, African countries 
were divided by a different measure of authoritarian support.  Countries categorized as “more 
willing to accept authoritarianism” displayed less than 60% rejection of both strong-man and 
military rule as well as over 10% agreeing that sometimes an authoritarian regime can be better.  
All other African countries were considered “less willing to accept authoritarianism.”8  For these 
two regions, I will seek to find significant differences between both groups of countries in terms 
of economic, political and cultural/historical variables.  In Central and Eastern Europe, the four 
countries will simply be presented individually.   
During this regional analysis, I will also zoom in and scrutinize a specific country from 
each region with unusually high support for authoritarianism.  These countries will be Guatemala, 
Lesotho and Ukraine.  These cases were chosen because of both their persistent support for 
authoritarianism over several survey periods as well as their high support based on several 
different measures (See Appendix A).   
The second section of this project will investigate the peculiar case of high authoritarian 
support in Ukraine.  I will then use the “most similar” systems (or method of difference) 
                                                 
7
 Countries with high authoritarian support in Latin America: Brazil, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay.  Countries with low authoritarian 
support: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
8
 Countries with high authoritarian support in Africa: Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania.  Countries with low authoritarian 
support: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Senegal, Uganda, 
and Zambia. 
 10
approach to root out the drivers of authoritarian sympathy in Guatemala as compared to 
Nicaragua.  This process involves choosing countries that are similar in many aspects but have 
different levels of support for authoritarianism.  Due to the likeness of the cases in this 
comparative approach, I should be able to identify important differences between the two 
countries that may influence regime support.  The findings from the regional analysis will guide 
these smaller-scale investigations. 
Due to the fact that this investigation relies mainly on cross-national survey data, 
authoritarianism is conceptualized very generally as any non-democratic form of rule.  Where 
survey questions simply ask respondents about authoritarianism as a regime choice, we should 
not expect all survey-takers to be applying the same definition.  Often individual interpretations 
of what authoritarianism means will be determined by prior experience within the country or the 
experience of neighboring countries.  Where possible, I will employ measures of support for 
concrete authoritarian alternatives where power is clearly not derived from the people, but rather 
from the military or a strongman ruler. 
Significance 
Many scholars have recognized the importance of legitimacy for the survival and 
development of any regime.  Congruence theory is represented in a body of work arguing that 
political institutions in a country must be in line with similar orientations among the population.9  
That means that a democratic regime in a country with undemocratic or authoritarian citizens 
will be bound for failure.  Larry Diamond makes this argument fairly convincingly in his book 
Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation, where he asserts that for a democracy to 
                                                 
9
 Christian Welzel and Ronald F. Inglehart, “Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change,” 
Democratization, edited by Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald F. Inglehart, and 
Christian Welzel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 126-144. 
 11
consolidate, 70-75% of the population should consider democracy to be better than all other 
possible regime types.  If this proves to be true, it would seem logical to look at the factors that 
drive this type of support.  It would also seem particularly important to find countries that show 
wide support for those other possible regime types and understand why this is the case. 
However, there may be some reason to doubt the idea that popular preferences will be 
borne out in political institutions.  For example, the trends observed in Chart 1.1 above show 
higher levels of support for authoritarianism in Latin America as compared to Africa even 
though levels of democracy are generally higher in the former region.  Even if one does not buy 
the argument that authoritarian-minded citizens could be a danger for the development of 
democracy, this investigation still has value.  The question remains disputed within the 
democratization literature.  The persistence of support for authoritarianism is an interesting 
puzzle that can help improve an understanding of the way that countries transition to democracy 
and the role of the people in that process.  This research project will attempt to add to what I 



































problems but it is 
still the best form 
of government” 
% Agreeing “I 
would support a 
military government 
in replacement of a 
democratic one if 
things got very bad” 
Average 
Argentina 4 (F) 13.8 10.5 24.4 16.2 
Bolivia 6 (PF) 11.9 24.2 21.2 19.1 
Brazil 4 (F) 22.3 17.5 24.4 21.4 
Chile 2 (F) 14.6 11.7 20.0 15.4 
Colombia 7 (PF) 12.1 17.6 32.7 20.8 
Costa Rica 2 (F) 15.1 17.2 9.0 13.8 
Dominican 
Republic 
4 (F) 22.5 16.4 23.8 20.9 
Ecuador 6 (PF) 24.4 14.2 24.6 21.1 
El Salvador 5 (F) 17.4 24.2 35.6 25.7 
Guatemala 8 (PF) 24.7 36.7 56.6 39.3 
Honduras 8 (PF) 28.9 24.1 37.3 30.1 
Mexico 6 (PF) 15.4 40.9 41.0 32.4 
Nicaragua 8 (PF) 17.8 16.2 19.9 18.0 
Panama 3 (F) 21.4 14.6 26.5 20.8 
Paraguay 6 (PF) 26.2 19.1 43.8 29.7 
Peru 5 (F) 17.4 21.7 41.6 26.9 
Uruguay 2 (F) 12.0 6.3 19.2 12.5 
Venezuela 10 (PF) 14.1 12.7 25.9 17.6 
 
World Values Survey (2012-2014) 
 % Saying Good: 
A Strong Leader 
who does not 
have to bother 
with parliament 
or Elections 
% Saying Good: 
Having the army 
rule 
% Saying 
democracy is not 
very important 
(1-4 on a 1-10 
scale) 
Average 
Chile 37.4 17.9 4 19.8 
Colombia 55.9 33.8 7.2 32.3 
Ecuador 71.3 24.7 1.8 32.6 
Mexico 58.7 52.6 2.9 38.1 
Peru 60.4 28.1 6.5 31.7 

































Benin 4 (F) 15.4 17.2 6.4 9.8 12.2 
Botswana 4 (F) 17.7 8.3 4.4 4.8 8.8 
Burkina Faso 8 (PF) 34.1 38.9 15 10.8 24.7 
Cape Verde 2 (F) 11.2 6.2 11.4 6.3 8.8 
Ghana 3 (F) 15 16 9.5 7.1 11.9 
Kenya 6 (PF) 14.2 3 4 7.8 7.3 
Lesotho 5 (F) 39.2 17.2 17.1 29.7 25.8 
Liberia 8 (PF) 16.3 19.4 8.9 9.1 13.4 
Madagascar 6 (PF) 9.7 12.6 7.1 5.7 8.8 
Malawi 8 (PF) 29.3 9.8 15.5 12.4 16.8 
Mali 4 (F) 15.8 24.4 10.4 11.7 15.6 
Mozambique 7 (PF) 36.2 18.4 23 15.5 23.3 
Namibia 4 (F) 22.6 18.3 15.6 10.7 16.8 
Nigeria 8 (PF) 15.9 12.4 8.3 16.8 13.4 
Senegal 5 (F) 4.9 19.4 4.1 6.4 8.7 
South Africa 3 (F) 19.5 14.7 13.6 17.8 16.4 
Tanzania 7 (PF) 34.4 7.9 5.7 12.7 15.2 
Uganda 9 (PF) 16.1 12.5 5.7 6.7 10.3 
Zambia 8 (PF) 16.5 6.3 4.7 7 8.6 













































Benin 4 (F) 10 11 5 9 8.8 
Botswana 5 (F) 19 8 6 7 10 
Burkina Faso 7 (PF) 15 24 6 5 12.5 
Burundi 10 (PF) 19 12 11 3 11.3 
Cape Verde 2 (F) 9 9 5 6 7.3 
Ghana 3 (F) 9 11 6 7 8.3 
Guinea 10 (PF) 13 23 20 10 16.5 
Kenya 7 (PF) 22 9 6 10 11.8 
Lesotho 6 (PF) 32 14 11 19 19 
Liberia 7 (PF) 7 17 6 5 8.8 
Madagascar 10 (PF) 10 20 8 9 11.8 
Malawi 7 (PF) 23 10 11 14 14.5 
Mali 5 (F) 18 34 13 19 21 
Mauritius 3 (F) 5 2 3 5 3.75 
Morocco 9 (PF) 6 6 6 10 7 
Mozambique 7 (PF) 25 17 13 11 16.5 
Namibia 4 (F) 20 15 13 15 15.75 
Niger 7 (PF) 15 30 19 8 18 
Nigeria 8 (PF) 10 14 7 19 12.5 
Senegal 6 (PF) 9 13 8 5 8.75 
Sierra Leone 6 (PF) 10 9 6 15 10 
South Africa 4 (F) 21 15 15 15 16.5 
Togo 9 (PF) 12 28 10 5 13.8 
Tunisia 7 (PF) 32 33 12 11 22 
Uganda 9 (PF) 15 8 6 10 9.8 
Tanzania 6 (PF) 22 18 6 10 14 
Zambia 7 (PF) 12 3 4 4 5.8 
 
World Values Survey 2010-2014 
 % Approving of 
strongman rule 





Estonia 29.2 3.9 12.3 15.1 
Poland 20 19 14.9 18.0 
Romania 69.7 28.6 11.9 36.7 
Ukraine 71.3 12.7 14.6 32.9 
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Chapter 2: Economics and Regime Support 
 
An early line of scholarship, generally looking at the transitions to democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), stresses the importance of a new democracy’s economic experience 
in shaping its population’s regime preferences.  Some proponents of this view highlight the 
importance of modernization-related factors like education and urbanization.  Others tend to 
view regime preference as a simple economic consideration: would I (or my country) be better 
off economically under a different regime type?  The expectation is to find support for 
democracy in states that achieve a net improvement in the economic situation of the country.  In 
general, an experience of growth and wealth under democratic institutions should promote 
democratic support while an experience of hardship or scarcity should cause a desire to turn to 
some authoritarian alternative. 
Looking at the transitions in CEE, Adam Przeworski suggests that the populations of 
transitioning countries have little experience with a market economy and form expectations 
based on promises from political leaders.  Their assessment of democracy as a regime then will 
be determined by how the reality of democracy and a market economy stack up to their 
expectations.10  Herbert Kitschelt also offers a perspective on this issue in an article explaining 
the formation of party systems in CEE.  He argues that countries that experience less economic 
development will have populations that are more authoritarian in their political orientations and 
preferred parties.  Conversely, more economic development will produce a more libertarian, 
inclusive and participatory population.11 
                                                 
10
 Adam Przeworksi, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 184. 
11
 Herbert Kitschelt. “The Formation of Part Systems in East Central Europe”, Politics and 
Society, 20 (1992), 19-20. 
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Proponents of this line of thinking give a number of theoretical reasons for the connection 
between regime support and economics.  These tend to take the form of modernization 
explanations and explanations rooted in more short-term economic experiences.  Those viewing 
modernization as central to regime support claim that increasing affluence, a larger middle class, 
more free time, and better educational opportunities will “democratize” the population.  As 
Kitschelt puts it, these conditions will increase citizens’ capacities to “exhibit individualism and 
to claim greater control over their life sphere.”12  Others have argued that development and 
wealth provides citizens with a stake in the system, making politics less of a zero-sum game.13   
Those who find the recent economic experience of a country to be more important tend to 
fall closer to Przeworski’s framework that regime support will be determined by how the reality 
of democracy stacks up to citizens’ expectations.  Following this argument, citizens will judge 
democracy based on whether the government is able to provide an improvement in living 
standards or if, instead, economic conditions cause uncertainty and suffering.14  Additionally, 
Economic performance in the short-term has been found to drive satisfaction with democracy, 
which is in turn correlated with support for democracy, suggesting at least an indirect effect on 
regime legitimacy.15 
Applying these ideas to authoritarian support, we may first expect to see high popular 
willingness to accept authoritarian institutions of government in less modernized countries 
characterized by lower per capita GDP, education and levels of urbanization.  Perhaps in these 
                                                 
12
 Ibid, 20. 
13
 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and Economics of Democratic 
Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies”, British Journal of Political 




 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 203. 
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less developed countries, authoritarian values persist because they have not had the 
democratizing experience of industrialization, urbanization and education.  Turning to short-term 
explanations, we might expect that in a situation of deprivation, high inflation, and poverty, 
citizens might blame the political system and shift their loyalty to some non-democratic 
alternative.16  This assumes that citizens will view some kind of authoritarian regime as more 
stable, decisive and better armed to tackle difficult economic issues.  Indeed the process of 
economic reform under democratic institutions sacrifices some degree of efficiency for a more 
inclusive, open decision-making process. 
In order to get a full picture of the differences in economic situations between countries, I 
look at both objective and subjective measures of how the economy is performing.  First, I will 
investigate a series of objective (or macro-level) measures of both modernization and economic 
growth such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, urbanization, education, inflation, inequality and 
poverty, in order to capture each country’s recent and historical economic experience under 
democracy.  In the second half of this chapter I will look at several subjective (or micro-level) 
measures of perceptions of economic conditions derived from responses to survey questions 
contained in the Latinobarómetro, Afrobarometer and World Values Survey.  
Objective Measures 
 The tables below include several measures that seek to capture important elements of the 
economic situation in the regions under investigation.  To measure levels of modernization and 
development, I have employed levels of GDP per capita, percentage of the population that is 
urban, and mean years of education.  All of these variables are expected to be lower in countries 
characterized by higher popular support for authoritarianism. To capture each country’s more 




recent economic experience under democratic institutions, I rely on ten-year averages of GDP 
growth and inflation.  Lower GDP growth and higher inflation are expected to be associated with 
countries that display higher levels of authoritarian support, as citizens will be disappointed in 
the democratic government’s inability to provide prosperity and may seek alternative means to 
do so.  Related to this is a measure of the percent of the population below the national poverty 
line in each country.  This seeks to capture the degree to which democracy appears able to tackle 
the difficult issue of its impoverished citizens.  Higher poverty should be associated with a 
willingness to accept non-democratic solutions in the form of a more authoritarian regime.  
Poverty might also be linked to modernization and education levels, which could have an 
independent effect on regime support. 
 The final measure employed below looks at levels of inequality captured by each state’s 
GINI coefficient.17  Although the scholarship does not generally indicate inequality as a driver of 
authoritarian or democratic support, there may be some reason to believe it is relevant.  On the 
one hand, citizens might blame the current democratic government for failing to address this 
important economic issue, shifting their hopes to an authoritarian populist promising speedy 
reform. Alternatively, deepening democracy could threaten elite interests and turn some who are 
on the winning side of inequality toward support for authoritarian options.  My analysis indicates 
a small but notable effect of inequality on authoritarian support in Latin America, but the drivers 
behind this trend are somewhat unclear. 
 To determine whether these factors contribute to authoritarian support, the countries have 
been divided into two categories based on the criteria identified in Chapter 1.  The following 
analysis will look for significant differences between the group of countries with populations 
                                                 
17
 The GINI index measures how far the distribution of income in a particular country is from 
perfect equality.  On a 0-100 scale, a higher score indicates a more unequal country. 
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identified as more willing to support authoritarianism and those that are less willing.  
Additionally, I will separate out one interesting case in both Latin America and Africa that has 
notably high levels (Guatemala and Lesotho). 
 The results suggest that there is significant regional variation with regard to the salience 
of economic factors.  In Latin America, modernization and inequality appear somewhat relevant 
to explanations of authoritarian support.  In CEE, poor short-term economic experience and low 
GDP per-capita characterize the countries with higher authoritarian support.  In Africa, there is 
little evidence that economic factors are important at all.   
Latin America 
In Latin America, Table 2.1 shows some interesting differences between countries with 
higher authoritarian support and those with lower levels.  In terms of modernization, the 
differences are as predicted with higher authoritarian support being present in countries with a 
smaller urban population, lower GDP per capita and lower levels of education.  However, only 
urbanization is significant at the 0.1 level.  In general, this offers some tentative support to the 
idea that countries that are slow to develop and industrialize may be prone to higher authoritarian 
support.  An experience of urbanization could introduce more open, democratic ideas to a 
population as opposed to a more isolated and traditional rural environment.  Still, a lack of 
development is not the death knell of popular authoritarian sentiment.  Some countries, like 
Brazil and Panama, where authoritarian options are more popular, have levels of modernization 
comparable to there less authoritarian counterparts.  Additionally, Bolivia and Nicaragua are 
characterized by relatively low authoritarian support despite some of the lowest levels of per 
capita GDP and urbanization. 
 20
 Table 2.1 generally indicates little difference between the two sets of countries in terms 
of inflation, GDP growth and poverty level.  This contradicts the predictions offered by the 
literature reviewed above.  In this region, it appears that authoritarian support can thrive under 
both good and bad economic conditions.  Based on this data, poor short-term economic 
performance does not seem to be fueling democratic defectors.  
























































































*3 countries are missing data for this variable 
Sources: The World Bank, UN Human Development Reports, Latinobarómetro 2011 
 
Moving beyond these basic economic indicators, there is an interesting difference 
between the GINI coefficients of both groups of countries indicating that, in Latin America, 
more unequal countries have populations that are more supportive of authoritarianism.  This 
relationship is demonstrated in Chart 2.1 below. The two groups of countries have, on average, 
 about a 5-point difference on the GINI
centrality of land reform in many emerging Latin American democracies combined with the 
difficulty of carrying it out under those new democratic institutions may cause populations to 
seek out alternative regime possibilities.
among the entrenched elite that democracy might bring a more equal distribution of wealth and 
power.  While I do not find decisive evidence in either direction, results from sur
presented further on seem to suggest that in some cases it is more likely the latter explanation 
that fits in Latin America. 
 
Chart 2.1: Inequality vs Willingness to Accept Authoritarianism in Latin America
Sources: World Bank, Latinobarómetro 2
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 Diamond, Developing Democracy,
 index.  One possible interpretation of this is that the 
18









 Guatemala sits at the negative extreme of each measure of economic experience.  It is 
characterized by an undeveloped economy, extremely high poverty and inequality, as well as 
relatively low GDP growth.  Whether these extreme levels have a greater effect on regime 
support than the slighter differences observed across other countries will be explored with a 
closer look at survey data further on.  In general I find that this is not the case. 
Africa   
In Africa, Table 2.2 shows no notable relationship between either modernization or 
economic growth indicators and authoritarian support.  For all variables the difference between 
both groups was miniscule.  In the cases of GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation and poverty 
the data actually shows poorer conditions among the group of countries less supportive of 
authoritarianism.   
Lesotho is somewhat unique in that it has lower GDP growth and greater inequality than 
the regional average.  Again, the degree to which this could indicate that relatively extreme 
economic stagnation has a greater effect on regime preference than smaller differences between 
other countries will be observed using subjective measures.  However, the data as a whole seems 
to contradict the idea that economic factors play a role in forming opinions about authoritarian 
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 Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or 
Instrumental?” British Journal of Political Science 31(3) (2001) 447-474. 
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#data used was the closest to 2006 available 
Sources: Afrobarometer 2008/2009, The World Bank 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
While it is difficult to make any definite conclusions based on the small number of cases 
available for Central and Eastern Europe, the table below reveals some interesting trends.  The 
more authoritarian-leaning cases (Ukraine and Romania) demonstrate notably worse economic 
performance than their less-authoritarian counterparts (Estonia and Poland).  Ukraine and 
Romania have lower average GDP growth over the ten years prior to the survey, a higher ten-
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year average of inflation and a higher proportion of the population living under the national 
poverty line.  These findings are in line with the expectations of previous scholars looking at the 
region and suggest that an experience of economic hardship might lead some to reject democracy 
for some illiberal alternative.  Still, a 0.3 difference (at the highest) between GDP growths in 
these countries does not suggest a huge effect of economics on regime preference.  Oddly, 
Inequality was actually higher in the cases with less support for authoritarianism.    
Table 2.3: Economics and Authoritarian Support in Central and Eastern Europe 
 More Willing to Accept 
Authoritarian Alternatives 
Less Willing to Accept 
Authoritarian Alternatives 
Country 
(% Rejection of 













(% of Total) 
69% 54% 61% 68% 
GDP Per Capita 
(USD) 
3901 9499 13,648 18,783 
Mean Years of 
Schooling 
(Adults) 
11.3 10.7 11.8 12 




3.79 3.77 4.04 4.09 
Average Inflation 
(2002-2012) 
9.96 8.97 2.78 4.11 
GINI Index  
(2010) 
24.8 28.2 33.2 32.2 
Proportion Living 
Under National 
Poverty Line  
.241 .222 .106 .175 
Sources: World Values Survey 2010-2014, The World Bank 
 Levels of education and urbanization are generally similar across all four countries.  
However, Ukraine and Romania have significantly lower GDP per capita than Estonia and 
Poland.  This does not offer strong evidence that modernization is responsible for authoritarian 
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support in this region but we certainly can’t rule out the idea that relative levels of wealth have 
some effect. 
 Ukraine is more distinct than Romania for almost all of the variables except for GDP 
growth, which is only slightly larger than growth in Romania.  Although this data does not allow 
any definitive conclusions, there is certainly some preliminary evidence that economic difficulty 
may drive an embrace of authoritarianism in Central and Eastern Europe.  The degree to which 
these differences are mediated through citizens’ perceptions of the economy will be explored in 
the next section. 
Subjective Measures 
 The variables used above capture the economic situation of the countries as a whole but 
sometimes these numbers can be deceiving or ignore the real day-to-day experience of 
individuals in the country.  For this reason, many authors investigating the issue of regime 
support have opted to use survey data to determine each individual’s personal experience with 
the economy rather than using broad macro-level data.20  This approach assumes that changing 
regime preferences will be mediated through an individual’s perception of the economic situation 
rather than the official numbers.  The following tables investigate several subjective, personal 
measures of economic growth.  For each region I will list Kendall’s tau-b correlations between 
authoritarian support and economic factors.  The survey questions used for each region can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 I have also included the country-specific data for Lesotho and Guatemala in addition to 
data from the region as a whole.  This will help explore the possibility, suggested above, that 
extremely poor economic conditions could cause a bump in authoritarian support even though 
                                                 
20
 Evans and Whitefield; Richard Rose et al., Democracy and it’s Alternatives, The John 
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore (1998). 
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middling conditions do not have the same effect.  The findings are generally consistent with 
those for the objective variables, showing a limited effect of economic variables that differs from 
region to region.  The analysis of exceptional cases appears to reject the idea that notably poor 
conditions experienced in Guatemala, Lesotho and Ukraine have a greater effect on authoritarian 
support. 
Latin America 
 Attempting to capture similar variables to those used above, I have included both short-
term and long-term measures of perceptions of the economic situation in Latin America.  I look 
at perceptions of survey-takers’ own as well as their countries’ economic situations.  Also 
investigated are perceptions of fairness of income distribution, the government’s ability to handle 
poverty, and education levels.  The correlations of these variables with various measures of 
regime support are presented below in Table 2.4. 
 The results show that, while many elements of an individual’s perception of their own 
and their country’s economic situation are related to regime support (and generally in the 
predicted directions), the effects are small.  Citizens who view the country’s economic situation 
poorly are more likely to prefer authoritarianism, accept military rule and believe that democracy 
is not always the best form of rule.  Among generally weak predictors of authoritarian support, 
the most significant appear to be levels of education and perceptions that the government cannot 
solve the problem of poverty.  Again, these relationships are notably small but they are most 
powerful for explaining differences in the Churchillian notion that “democracy may have 
problems but it is the best system of government.”  Economically frustrated Latin Americans 
seem comparatively reluctant to endorse more concrete forms of authoritarian rule. 
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 Interestingly, perceptions of unfair distribution of income are not connected with all 
measures of support for authoritarianism.  This may help rule out the idea that the poor, 
dissatisfied with an unequal system, are clamoring for authoritarian rule.  On the contrary, the 
case of Guatemala may offer some evidence that it is actually the wealthy that tend to find 
authoritarianism suitable.  Lower levels of education are significantly correlated with a 
decreasing preference for authoritarianism in Guatemala, the reverse of what the modernization 
literature might predict.  However, if we consider the fact that the poor are much more likely to 
lack education in Guatemala, we may find an explanation to this apparent contradiction in 
another body of work.  Carles Boix has argued that for the “democratic game” to work in a given 
country, it is crucial that there be some degree of equality of conditions.  Absent this level 
playing ground, the “incentives to cheat become irresistible.”21  This means that those who 
benefit most from inequality might be open to authoritarian forms of rule that could prolong their 
position of strength.  It seems entirely possible that this is operating in Guatemala (a highly 
unequal country), but the degree of inequality’s overarching relevance for authoritarian support 
in the region as a whole remains unclear.  Additionally, I find evidence in Chapter 6 that the 
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 Carles Boix, “The Roots of Democracy,” Policy Review (February & March 2006). 
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Table 2.4: Subjective Economic Assessments and Regime Support in Latin America 
 Authoritarianism 























.020** .014* .086** .007 
Income 
Distribution Unfair 
-.012 -.020** .062** .038 
Government Can’t 
Solve the Problem 
of Poverty 
.092** .046** .140** .027 
Lower level of 
Education Attained 
.056** .067** .066** -.110** 
* significant at .05 level 
** significant at .01 level 
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding here is the fact that no subjective measure of the 
economic situation helps explain authoritarian support in Guatemala.  While it is important to 
point out that the much larger number of cases for the entire region would be affecting statistical 
significance, the correlations are quite low as well in Guatemala.  Only education (an aspect of 
modernization) seems to be related to levels of regime support among the population.  This 
seems to run contrary to the idea, suggested above, that the extremely poor economic conditions 
in Guatemala might make the democratic government’s economic performance all the more 
important for garnering legitimacy.  Instead, we see that this kind of performance is irrelevant to 




 In Africa, a slightly different set of economic variables was used based on the available 
survey data.  Similar to Latin America, this analysis includes perceptions of both the country’s 
and one’s personal economic situation.  Also used is a measure of how the survey-taker feels 
their economic situation stacks up to that of other citizens.  To capture poverty, I have included a 
question asking how often the respondent’s family goes without food in a 12-month period.  This 
is different from the question used in Latin America that captures feelings about the 
government’s capability to alleviate poverty rather than the respondent’s own situation.  Finally, 
to gauge the effect of modernization I have employed levels of education and a simple 
rural/urban variable for where the survey took place.  Again, the specific measures used below 
can be found in Appendix B. 
 Consistent with the results from objective economic measures, there seems to be less of 
an impact of economic assessment on regime support in Africa compared to Latin America.  
Most economic measures are statistically significant for explaining some (but not all) measures 
of authoritarian support.  However, their effect is very small.  Only poverty and education levels 
consistently explain regime support and these too have limited impacts.    
 In Lesotho, short-term economic evaluations as well as impoverished conditions do not 
help explain the high levels of support for authoritarianism in the country.  Modernization 
indicators, however, do seem to impact regime legitimacy.  Levels of education and the 
rural/urban measure are both statistically significant with correlation coefficients comparable to 




Table 2.5: Subjective Economic Assessments and Regime Support in Africa 


























.024** .037** .020** -.051 
Level of 
Education 
.013* -.114** -.080** .126** 
Rural Area -.005 .081** .025** -.085** 
* significant at .05 level 
** significant at .01 level 
 
 The data here suggests that we accept some limited impact of economic factors on 
authoritarian support in Africa.  However, this effect is very small, especially compared with the 
other regions under observation.  Only education and poverty help explain all three measures of 
authoritarian support included in this analysis, albeit with limited predictive power.   
 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 To measure the effect of the economy on authoritarian support in Central and Eastern 
Europe I employed questions included in the World Values Survey.  To obtain an idea of overall 
contentment with living conditions, a measure of satisfaction with one’s personal financial 
situation is included below.  Poverty is measured by the respondent’s answer to how often they 
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or their family go without food.  Also included are modernization-related measures of education 
and urban or rural residence.   The relationships of these economic variables with regime support 
are presented in Table 2.6. 
 In this region, certain economic variables seem to have greater explanatory power than in 
Africa or Latin America, but their effect is still limited.  Higher levels of education are 
consistently associated with preferences against authoritarianism and for democracy.  A more 
educated person is notably more likely to reject military rule in favor of democracy, although the 
effect on rejection of strongman rule is more limited.  Poverty as well is consistently significant 
and in the direction predicted, although to varying degrees of strength.  It is most powerful as an 
explanation for support for an undemocratic strong leader.  Some impoverished Central and 
Eastern Europeans demonstrate a willingness to embrace a strongman-style form of rule that 
could perhaps bring the solutions that democracy has failed to deliver.   Both satisfaction with 
one’s personal financial situation and the size of one’s town are statistically significant but with 
low correlation coefficients and not always in the predicted direction.   
 Ukraine generally shows similar trends to the region as a whole.  Poverty and low 
education seem to drive rejection of democracy to a limited degree.  Dissatisfaction with 
personal finances does not appear related to authoritarian support and those living in more rural 
areas are only slightly more likely to reject democracy.  The economic dimension of 






Table 2.6: Subjective Economic Assessments and Regime Support in CEE 

















.155** .090** -.046** -.077** 
Education Level .051** .138** -.106** -.086** 
Size of Town -.028** .058** -.055** -.045* 
* significant at .05 level 
** significant at .01 level 
 
 Evidence from all three regions suggests that, at the individual level, economic conditions 
and perceptions are not irrelevant to regime commitment.  Economic downturn and poverty 
appear to play a minor role in the formation of regime preferences, with poor conditions driving 
some to consider non-democratic alternatives like military or strongman rule.  Still, consistent 
with the results from analysis of macro-level economic indicators, the effect of economics is 
very small and varies across regions and even countries.  It is also clear that economic factors do 
not play a significantly more decisive role in the cases identified with notably poor economic 
conditions and high popular authoritarian support. 
Conclusions 
 The evidence on whether economic conditions affect authoritarian support is thoroughly 
mixed and there is significant regional variation in terms of what factors matter the most.  In 
Latin America, incomplete modernization seems to play a minor role in driving authoritarian 
support.  Countries with a larger proportion of the population living in rural areas have a 
tendency toward higher mass support for autocracy.  The same can be said of lower levels of 
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education at the individual level.  The record is mixed on whether short-term considerations 
matter for authoritarian support in the region, but if they do, their effect is weak.   
Country’s that are more unequal tend to have higher popular preferences for authoritarian 
rule in Latin America.  However, zooming in to the individual level to test the effect of 
perceptions of inequality on authoritarian support leaves us with more questions than answers.  
Perceptions of a lack of income equality do not appear to be responsible for driving Latin 
Americans to authoritarian alternatives across the board.  The impact of an unequal society on 
authoritarian support, observed at the country level, may be caused by some other, uncovered 
factor not immediately connected in the minds of citizens. 
African preferences for authoritarian rule seem to be highly resistant to varying economic 
conditions both short-term and long-term.  Country-level analysis revealed no important trends 
while survey data showed very small associations between some economic variables and 
measures of regime support.  Low education and poverty are the only economic indicators that 
seem to drive authoritarian support, and their effects are small. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, the countries with higher authoritarian support had lower 
average GDP growth, higher inflation and higher levels of poverty.  Survey data confirms the 
effect of poverty and reveals that lower education may be driving regime support to some degree.  
It is worth keeping in mind that the small number of cases in this region may be behind the stark 
differences observed at the regional level. 
Some trends can be observed across all three regions.  The effects of short-term 
evaluations of the economic situation tend to have only a very small effect on authoritarian 
support.  This suggests that economic downturn is unlikely to bring calls for the overthrow of 
newly democratic governments.  What seems to matter more are longer-term economic trends.  
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In particular, high levels of poverty and lower education tend to be found where there is higher 
authoritarian support.  The effect of education might be explained by Russell Dalton’s theory 
that educated individuals will be better able to depend on themselves rather than elites for 
forming political preferences.22  The flip side of that would be that less educated individuals are 
more likely to rely on often-deceptive elites as reference points for determining their preferred 
regime type.   This could potentially lead some to support charismatic, authoritarian populists. 
Under, conditions of extreme poverty, citizens could be expected to simply look for a 
way out rather than putting their faith into slow and weighty democratic institutions.  
Additionally, it is highly likely that poverty and low education are often found in the same places 
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 Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western 
Democracies (Chatham: Chatham House, 1996), 21. 
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Appendix B:  
 
Latin America: Economic Variables 
Economic Variables 




In general, how would you describe the 
country’s present economic situation? 
Would you say it is...? 
Very good, Good, About 




In general, how would you describe your 
present economic situation and that of your 
family? Would you say it is..? 
Very good, Good, About 






Do you consider your economic situation 
and that of your family to be much better, 
a little better, about the same, a little worse 
or much worse than 12 months ago? 
Much better, A little better, 





How fair do you think income distribution 
is in (country)? 
Very fair, Fair, Unfair, Very 
unfair 
Government 
Can’t Solve the 
Problem of 
Poverty 
To what extent do you think the state can 
solve...the problem of poverty? 
All the problem, A large part 




What level of education do you have? 
What was the last year you completed? 
0-17 years 
Regime Support 
Variable Survey Question Ordered Responses 
Authoritarianism 
can be preferable 
With which of the following statements do 
you agree most? 
Democracy is preferable to 
any other kind of government; 
Under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian government can 




Would you support a military government 
in replacement of a democratic one if 
things get very bad? Or would you not 
support a military government under any 
circumstance? 
I would support a military 
government in replacement of 
a democratic government if 
things get very bad; I would 
not support a military 





But is Still Better 
Do you strongly agree (1), agree (2), 
disagree (3) or strongly disagree (4) with 
the following statements?  ... Democracy 
may have problems but it is the best 
Strongly agree, Agree, 
Disagree, Strongly disagree 
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Than Alternatives system of government. 
 
Africa: Economic Variables 
Economic Variables 
Variable Survey Question Ordered Responses 
Country’s Economic Situation 
Bad 
In general, how would you 
describe... the present 
economic condition of this 
country? 
Very bad, Fairly bad, Neither 
good nor bad, Fairly good, 
Very good 
Personal Economic Situation 
Bad 
In general, how would you 
describe... your own present 
living conditions? 
Very bad, Fairly bad, Neither 
good nor bad, Fairly good, 
Very good 
Personal Economic Situation 
Better than other citizens 
In general, how do you rate 
your living conditions 
compared to those of other 
Basotho? 
Much worse, Worse, Same, 
Better, Much better 
Family Often Doesn’t Have 
Enough Food 
Over the past year, how often, 
if ever, have you or anyone in 
your family gone 
without...enough food to eat? 
Never, Just once or twice, 
Several times, Many times, 
Always 
Level of Education What is the highest level of 
education you have 
completed? 
No formal schooling; Informal 
schooling only (including 
Koranic schooling); 
Some primary schooling; 
Primary school completed; 
Some secondary school / high 
school; Secondary school / 
high school completed; Post-
secondary qualifications, other 
than university e.g. a diploma 
or degree from a technikon or 
college; Some university; 
University completed; Post-
graduate 
Rural Area [Circle One] Urban, Rural 
Regime Support 
Variable Survey Question Ordered Responses 
Rejection of Authoritarianism Which of these three 
statements is closest to your 
own opinion? 
In some circumstances, a non-
democratic government can be 
preferable; Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of 
government 
Approval of One-Party Rule There are many ways to 
govern a country. Would you 
disapprove or approve of the 
following alternatives? ... 
Strongly disapprove, 
disapprove, Neither approve 
nor disapprove, Approve, 
Strongly Approve 
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Only one political party is 
allowed to stand for 
election and hold office. 
Approval of Military Rule There are many ways to 
govern a country. Would you 
disapprove or approve of the 
following alternatives? ... The 
army comes in to govern the 
country. 
Strongly disapprove, 
disapprove, Neither approve 
nor disapprove, Approve, 
Strongly Approve 
 
Central and Eastern Europe: Economic Variables 
Economic Variables 
Variable Survey Question Ordered Responses 
Satisfaction With Personal 
Financial Situation 
 
How satisfied are you with the 
financial situation of your 
household?  
1 (completely dissatisfied) - 
10 (completely satisfied) 
Family Always Has Enough 
Food 
In the last 12 month, how 
often have you or your 
family...gone without enough 
food to eat? 
Often, Sometimes, Rarely, 
Never 
 
Education Level What is the highest 
educational level that you 
have attained? 
No formal education; 
Incomplete primary school; 
Complete primary school; 
Incomplete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type; 







education, without degree; 
University-level education, 
with degree 
Size of Town (Code size of town) Under 2,000; 2,000 - 5,000; 5-
10,000; 10 - 20,000; 20 - 
50,000; 50 - 100,000; 100 - 
500,000; 500,000 and more 
Regime Support 
Rejection of Strongman Rule I'm going to describe various 
types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each 
as a way of governing this 
country...Having a strong 
leader who does not have to 
Very Good, Fairly Good, 
Fairly Bad, Very Bad 
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bother with parliament and 
elections 
Rejection of Military Rule I'm going to describe various 
types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each 
as a way of governing this 
country... Having the army 
rule 
Very Good, Fairly Good, 
Fairly Bad, Very Bad 
Rejection of Democracy I'm going to describe various 
types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each 
as a way of governing this 
country... Having a democratic 
political system 
Very Good, Fairly Good, 





















Chapter 3: Politics and Regime Preference 
 A second body of work looking at regime legitimacy argues that rather than delivering on 
economic growth, citizens are more inclined to support democracy if their country “delivers on 
its promise of freedom and democracy.”23  This line of thinking suggests that citizens can and 
will separate their country’s economic experience from its political experience and avoid turning 
against the regime simply because it has not brought the country prosperity.  This chapter will 
proceed on the basis of this literature on democratic support, mainly because it is the only 
literature available and the two variables (democratic and authoritarian support), although 
perhaps not exact opposites, are clearly related. 
 In 1995, Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield conducted one of the first systematic, 
quantitative investigations into the drivers of democratic support looking at Central and Eastern 
Europe.24  They find that support for democracy in this region is primarily influenced by 
individual evaluations of regime performance and responsiveness.  They note a few important 
political conditions that weigh heavily on these regime evaluations.  Firstly, when constitutional 
conflict is central to the political dialogue, it is likely to turn citizens away from the seemingly 
unstable regime type.  Polarization between congress and the president is cited as a source of 
frustration that can decrease democratic support.  Evans and Whitefield also argue that party 
attachments can “reflect and develop a sense among the public of an input into the democratic 
process”.25  These political variables, taken as a whole, are much more influential in their 
statistical analysis than economic factors. 
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 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, The John Hopkins University 
Press (Baltimore: 1999), 192. 
24
 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and Economics of Democratic 
Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies,” British Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1995), p. 485-514. 
25
 Ibid, 499. 
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 Analyzing 2001 Latinobarómetro data, Marta Lagos finds that political variables are the 
most important determinant of democratic support in Latin America as well.26   Lagos argues that, 
although extreme economic hardship can influence regime support (an idea that may be at odds 
with the findings from chapter 2), it is the delivery of certain “political goods” that has the 
greatest effect on support for democracy.  For example, one particularly important event that 
promotes democratic support occurs when there is a peaceful transition of power, preferably to a 
marginalized societal group.  However, Lagos makes the distinction between democratic and 
authoritarian support, noting that, in general, a lack of democratic support does not mean a 
surplus of authoritarian support.  Rather, many Latin Americans feel indifferent and distant from 
the electoral process; they don’t support democracy but also don’t embrace any specific 
alternative.  My findings offer support to this notion.  
 Another study, carried out by Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, analyzing three 
African countries, also shows that political considerations take precedence over economics.27  
They note, similar to Lagos, that the most influential factor across all cases is to what level the 
survey taker believes the country has delivered on a “basket of political goods.”  These include 
equality before the law, individual rights, and free and fair elections.  The provision of these 
“goods,” as well as an interest in politics and a general satisfaction with the government’s 
performance are the best conditions for democratic support.   
There are many reasons to believe that the political factors pointed out here will be 
relevant not only to democratic legitimacy but also popular support for authoritarianism.  If 
general perceptions hold that democracy is not providing freedom and choice as it purports to do, 
                                                 
26
 Marta Lagos Cruz-Coke, “A Road with No Return?” Journal of Democracy, 14 (2) (2003), 
163-173. 
27
 Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or 
Instrumental?,” British Journal of Political Science, 31(3) (2001), 447-474. 
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citizens might be more open to different constructions of political power.  Similarly, if 
democratic institutions are seen as unresponsive, the siren call of a populist leader promising real 
change could be tempting.  The findings below suggest that this is true to a very limited degree 
in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.  In Africa, political evaluations offer very 
little to explain authoritarian support.  
Turning to two specific political factors that may be particularly relevant to authoritarian 
support, I look at corruption and historical repression.  High levels of corruption might be 
expected to undermine regime support. 28  Mitchell Seligson has found that corruption 
victimization erodes regime legitimacy in Latin America.29  Corruption may be seen by the 
population to be fully unproductive rent-seeking that often appears to be permitted by the state.  
These kinds of flawed democratic systems could produce a disenchanted population that is 
willing to give up some freedom in order to bring an end to pervasive corruption. Kurt Weyland 
has suggested that corruption may have even increased in Latin America under democratic 
institutions.30   The diffuse decision making structure of democracy means that their are more 
points in the policy making process where bribes can be demanded in exchange for consent.  In 
short, there are more palms to grease.  Surely there is also more press coverage of high profile 
corruption cases that authoritarian regimes would have been more likely to successfully suppress.  
If democracy and corruption are perceived as growing together, pervasive corruption might give 
the population good reason to seek an alternative means of governance.  My analysis indicates 
                                                 
28
 See: Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu, Chong-Min Park, “Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia,” 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2007) 74. 
29
 Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative 
Study of Four Latin American Countries,” The Journal of Politics, 64(2) (2002), 408-433. 
30
 Kurt Weyland, “The Politics of Corruption in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy, 9(2) 
(1998), 108. 
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that corruption does contribute to authoritarian support, except in Africa where politics, like 
economics, appear fairly irrelevant for explaining regime legitimacy.   
As a final variable, I will investigate levels of political repression to see if a history of 
regime violence might dissuade support for future authoritarian regimes.  It was Rose and his 
colleagues that introduced the idea of legitimacy being intimately connected with a country’s 
past political experience.  They write: “[t]he alternatives with which democracy  competes are 
other familiar forms of government that have been tried and found wanting.”31  This means that 
democracy will tend to be judged in light of the successes and failures of whatever non-
democratic regime existed before.  Despite the focus on regime history, historical repression 
levels seem to be left out of their comparative analysis—and the analysis of many who attempt to 
explain regime legitimacy.  We could expect that a high level of violence in a past regime could 
form a national memory that would dissuade citizens from accepting a similar regime.  
Conversely, if political violence is roughly similar or has actually gotten worse under democratic 
institutions it seems likely that the members of that polity would see the past regime as a viable 
alternative, or even long for its reestablishment.   
 This chapter will proceed by first investigating objective, macro-level trends between 
countries with populations identified as more supportive of authoritarianism and those with 
lower levels of support.  I will then drill down to the individual level using survey data to search 
for important correlations between more specific political variables and regime support.    
Objective Measures 
The Freedom House measures of “Freedom in the World” can help provide a glance at 
the degree to which new democracies have progressed politically.  These scores are released 
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 Richard Rose, William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives: 
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annually and rate each country in terms of its political rights and civil liberties.  This makes it a 
useful measure for determining the degree to which each country is able to provide the long list 
of political goods associated with democracy.  Below, I employ each country’s ranking as well 
as the ten-year change in their scores to account for improvement or decline of political 
conditions.  It is important to note that a lower score implies a more democratic country and 
scores range from 1-7. 
 I measure corruption using Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Perceptions are appropriate for this analysis because they will likely have a more direct effect on 
citizens’ feelings about their own and alternative regimes than actual levels of corruption.  For 
this measure, lower scores indicate a greater prevalence of corruption with a minimum of zero 
and a maximum of ten.   
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) allows us to quantify a country’s history of repression 
under the previous regime as compared to modern day levels.  On this scale, a 1 represents very 
little political violence while a 5 signifies high levels.  The reference point used for determining 
each country’s “previous regime” was the most recent time when that country’s Polity IV score 
was negative (meaning it was not a democracy).  I took an average of PTS scores starting from 
one year before that transition and going backwards 5 years.  I then took an average of PTS 
scores in the 3 years leading up to the survey used to determine authoritarian support, a period 
during which all of the included countries had positive Polity IV scores (2008-2010 in Latin 
America and 2005-2007 in Africa).  I then subtracted the average during the democratic period 
from the average during the authoritarian period to find the difference for each country.   Central 
and Eastern Europe are excluded from this analysis because PTS scores were not available. 
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the average of each of these variables for both sets of countries 
(more and less supportive of authoritarianism) as well as the difference between them and two-
tailed p-values.  Again, Guatemala and Lesotho are included for reference as cases with very 
high authoritarian support.  Table 3.3 shows the relevant data for each of the four countries 
observed in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Latin America 
 In Latin America, popular support for authoritarianism is linked to some political factors 
more than others.  Table 3.1 shows that countries with higher popular rejection of 
authoritarianism are only slightly more democratic based on their freedom house score.  
Guatemala, an outlier in authoritarian support, presents an unusually high Freedom House score 
(low level of democracy).  Unexpectedly, the countries that rejected authoritarianism actually 
showed deteriorating political rights and civil liberties, while those that were more willing to 
accept authoritarian options improved their democracies.  However, these differences do not 
reach statistical significance.   
Table 3.1: Politics and Regime Support in Latin America 
 Guatemala Countries With 
Populations 
more Willing to 
Accept 
Authoritarianism 













































Sources: Latinobarómetro 2011, Freedom House, Transparency International 
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Corruption perceptions are greater in countries with higher popular support for 
authoritarianism and Guatemala follows this trend.  While differences in corruption do not reach 
statistical significance, there is a much greater difference than for the other measures.  On a ten-
point scale there is a one-point difference in corruption between the two groups of countries.  No 
country among those with higher popular support for authoritarianism scored above a four on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index.  Some countries, like Chile and Uruguay, that more readily reject 
authoritarianism scored seven or higher.   While general measures of democracy employed here 
are inconclusive, there is still a strong possibility that higher perceptions of corruption can cause 
some citizens to consider authoritarian alternatives.  
In Latin America, a region known for its “dirty wars” in response to leftist guerrilla 
movements, the weight of past repression does seem to have taken its toll.  Countries with 
populations that do not readily reject authoritarianism have, on average, only seen modest 
improvements (.25 on a scale of 1-5) in the situation of political violence.  Meanwhile, the 
countries where authoritarianism is rejected have seen much less repression under democratic 
institutions as compared to the previous regime (1.75 on a scale of 1-5).  A frightening collective 
memory of the cruelty of a past regime seems to have left a mark on the populations of these 
countries.  Guatemala is an interesting exception where high authoritarian support has persisted 
despite a significant decrease in repression.   The source of authoritarian support in Guatemala 
will be investigated in greater detail in Chapter 6.   
Another notable exception is Brazil, where the data indicates that repression has been 
ramped up significantly under democratic institutions yet authoritarian support is not as high as 
we might expect.  Whether an increase in repression has actually occurred is doubtful.  To some 
degree this reflects the difficulty of quantifying levels of repression.  My dataset, gathered from 
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PTS scores, consists of averages of two different measures of repression derived from Amnesty 
International and the US State Department.  In the case of Brazil, the US State Department 
considered the country to be far less repressive than Amnesty International, resulting in a lower 
overall score under authoritarian rule.  In more recent years, both measures have generally been 
in agreement.  The military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964-1985 did not hesitate to use 
violence in the form of extrajudicial killings, disappearances and torture.32   The fact that the 
United States at least tacitly—if not fully—backed the 1964 coup could certainly explain the 
gentler assessment given by the State Department to the military regime.  This dark period in the 
country’s history remains relevant today considering that, as with many Latin American 
countries, it went unaddressed for many years.   The director of Amnesty International in Brazil 
noted that recent revelations of Brazil’s National Truth Commission amplify “the country’s 
collective response of ‘Never Again’ to the mass violations of human rights during the 
authoritarian regime.”33   
The publicity of similar truth commissions in other Latin American countries as well as 
the collective social memory of events under authoritarian rule appears to be having an important 
impact on regime preferences.  This relationship is shown in Chart 3.1, which demonstrates the 
strong negative correlation between change in repression and authoritarian support. 
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 Chart 3.1: Political Repression vs. Authoritarian Support in Latin America
r = -0.69 
 
Africa 
 Neither level of democracy, change in level of democracy or perception of corruption has 
a significant effect on regime preference in Africa according to this data.  The largest difference 
between the countries more willing and those less willing to accept
case of change in level of democracy.  However, in both groups, democracy is improving.  
Lesotho is consistent with the other regional averages although its democracy has actually 
improved slightly more in the last ten years
predicts that improvements will cause higher democratic support) might lead us to expect.  
In Africa, the effect of a history of repression is in
direction we would expect.  Countries with high authoritarian rejection actually saw a greater 
 
 authoritarianism occurs in the 
.  This is the opposite of what the literature (which 





decrease in political violence, but neither grouping saw very significant improvements at all.  It 
is perhaps worth noting that, taken as a whole pre-transition repression levels in Latin America 
were higher than in Africa (3.46 compared to 2.87).   It appears that, among other factors, higher 
levels of political violence could have formed a more permanent memory that continues to 
influence citizens’ opinions of the past regime in Latin America, while lower levels of repression 
have left a smaller impact on African regime support. 
Table 2.3: Politics and Regime Support in Africa 
 Lesotho Countries With 
Populations 
more Willing to 
Accept 
Authoritarianism 














































Sources: Afrobarometer, Freedom House, Transparency International 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
In the Central and Eastern European countries, we can observe most noticeably that the 
two countries that are more supportive of authoritarian alternatives also have higher Freedom 
House scores.  This is an interesting finding, although it is difficult to determine its significance 
with so few cases.  There is almost no difference between ten-year changes in Freedom House 
scores, meaning that the level of development of democracy over time does not appear to be an 
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important factor.  All countries became more democratic except for Romania, which regressed 
slightly.   
  There is also a higher perception of corruption in the countries with populations that are 
more supportive of authoritarianism.  This is consistent with the idea that disaffection with the 
failures of the democratic system might lead to disaffection with the idea of it as a whole.  
Although the cases are limited, there is some evidence here that politics is related to regime 
support in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Table 3.1: Politics and Regime Support in Four Central and Eastern European Countries 
 Higher Authoritarian Support Lower Authoritarian Support 
Ukraine Romania Poland Estonia 
Freedom House 
Ranking 2011 
7 4 2 2 
Change in FH 
rankings (2001–
2011) 
-1 0 -1 -1 
Corruption 
Perception 2011 
2.3 3.6 5.5 6.4 
Sources: World Values Survey 2010-2014, Freedom House, Transparency International 
 Regional differences persist in this analysis of objective political measures.  In CEE, low 
levels of democracy attained as well as high perceptions of corruption can be observed in 
countries with more authoritarian support.  In Latin America, the same is true of corruption, but 
levels of democracy do not help predict regime support.  Africa continues to evade explanation 
with only miniscule differences between the two groupings of countries.  We now turn to micro-
level data to look for confirmation of these results. 
Subjective Measures 
 As with economic conditions, measures from international ranking organizations may 
sometimes fail to capture the reality for citizens in these countries.  A one point bump in 
Freedom House’s ranking may not be immediately visible to the entire population.  With 
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findings as limited as those above, it makes sense to look for other ways to measure the effect of 
politics on regime preference.  Digging in to survey data is one way of getting to the individual 
level to determine what considerations factor into decisions about regime preference.  In the 
section below, I will look for correlations between various survey questions relating to the 
political variables from the literature outlined above and several measures of regime support.  
The large number of cases for these international surveys may influence the fact that many 
variables are statistically significant so I will look not only at significance but, more importantly, 
at the magnitude of the correlations.  
Latin America 
 The data used for Latin America comes from the Latinobarómetro survey carried out in 
2011.  Many independent variables are used to uncover popular perceptions of the functioning of 
democracy.  To capture these perceptions at the most basic level, I have employed a question 
asking how satisfied the respondent is with democracy and another asking whether democracy 
has improved or worsened.  Next, to capture the delivery of what some scholars have called a 
“basket” of political goods, I built a composite measure that includes questions asking 
respondents about a number of general conditions that are normally expected of a democratic 
regime.  Among these are; guarantees of social justice, consolidation of political parties, citizen 
participation, reduced corruption, and increased transparency.  Admittedly, these items do not 
cover all of the so-called goods that democracy is supposed to provide but the available survey 
data is somewhat limiting.    
 51
 As a proxy for basic electoral efficacy I have included a measure of how likely it is that a 
survey-taker’s preferred political sector would make it to power.  Also included is a question that 
asks how well the government is able to deal with the problem of corruption.  
 I run each of these factors against several measures of regime support.  The first two 
measures seek to capture support for authoritarianism based on the percentage who agree that 
non-democratic rule can be preferable “under some circumstances” and the portion that approve 
of military rule.    The third dependent variable captures a lack of democratic support as 
measured by whether the survey-taker agrees that democracy is always the best form of 
government.  The final measure seeks to capture indifference to regime type in order to 
determine whether defection from democracy causes support for authoritarianism or simply a 
feeling of hopelessness.  All of the survey questions used in the tables below are presented in 
Appendix C.  In general, we can expect that where democratic conditions are seen as lacking, 
support for authoritarianism will increase. 
To simplify the presentation of this data (since survey questions often use a 1-10 point 
system or multiple possible answers), the tables below will show bivariate Kendall’s tau-b 
correlations between each survey question and various measures of regime support.  For this 
method to work, non-answers and answers like “don’t know” have been excluded from this 
analysis.  Table 3.4 has been set up so that positive correlations are consistent with the 
predictions based on the literature above (meaning that democratic failures drive authoritarian 
support, decrease democratic support, or increase indifference).  
 Perhaps the most notable finding from Table 3.4 is the fact that different types of regime 
support have different sources in Latin America.   Negative assessments of the progress of 
democracy appear critical to explaining low democratic support and indifference.  They are 
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somewhat less important, however, for explaining authoritarian support.  The data below seems 
to indicate that poorly functioning democratic institutions cause some individuals to stop 
supporting the democratic regime and to instead resign themselves to indifference: “for people 
like me, it doesn’t matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.”  A smaller, 
but still significant, number of people in this situation are driven to support authoritarian 
alternatives.   
 The most powerful drivers of regime support are more general assessments of the 
democratic system.  Dissatisfaction with democracy and perceptions of negative change in the 
system are associated with authoritarian support and, to a greater degree, indifference and 
defection from democracy.   Failure to deliver on political goods has a very limited effect on 
support for authoritarianism and indifference but no effect on democratic support.   This is 
somewhat consistent with the findings from objective measures, which saw small but 
comparable differences in levels of democracy at the country level.   
 Also important are perceptions of the government’s ability to handle corruption and the 
efficacy of the system.  Those who see corruption as a problem that the government cannot solve 
are, unsurprisingly, more indifferent and more likely to disapprove of democracy.  They are also 
more likely to embrace authoritarian alternatives.  This confirms the tentative finding above that 
high levels of corruption could drive authoritarian support.  Those who feel that their preferred 
political sector cannot make it to power are similarly supportive of authoritarianism over 




Table 3.4: Support for Authoritarianism and Politics in Latin America 










democracy is the 





.089** .058** .200** .138** 




.029** .051** -.007 .045** 
Individual’s 
party’s ideas 
can’t make it to 
power 




.109** .062** .235** .230** 




.089** .036** .142** .094** 
* Significant at the .05 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
 
Africa 
 Thanks to the Globobarometer’s efforts to coordinate these national surveys, many of the 
questions asked in Latin America were also asked in Africa, with some differences in wording.  
For example, rather than asking how democracy is progressing, the Afrobarometer asks how 
much of a democracy the respondent’s country is “today.”  This, along with satisfaction with 
democracy, are used to capture general feelings of how the system is functioning.   
 The delivery of political “goods” draws from a line item list of elements of democracy (in 
this case “freedoms”) including the freedom to “say what you think,” “join any political 
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organization you want,” and to “choose who to vote for without feeling pressured.”   The 
Afrobarometer also provides an even better measure of democratic efficacy by asking if the 
survey-taker feels that they could get together with like-minded citizens and change the mind of 
their national representative.   Finally, corruption is investigated in terms of how well the 
respondent believes the government is handling the issue.  
Again I have employed multiple dependent variables including two measures of 
authoritarian support (support for one-party rule and military rule), one measure of support for 
“non-democratic” rule in general, and a measure of indifference to regime type. The complete 
list of survey questions used in this analysis can be found in Appendix C.  Like the 
Latinobarometro data, these will be presented using correlations in order to simplify.  Again 
these are set up so that we should see positive correlations if perceptions of democracy are 
having the expected effects on regime support. 
 Consistent with the findings from objective variables, the survey data shows almost no 
impact of political factors on authoritarian support.  Only one variable—failure to deliver on 
political goods—is significant and in the expected direction for all four measures.   All of the 
other variables included indicate a very slight bump in authoritarian support as democracy 
improves, the reverse of our expectation.   
Support for non-democratic rule in general and indifference are somewhat in line with 
expectations but the effect is quite small.  Again, indifference appears to increase as democracy 
is perceived as being worse.  Taken as a whole, there is very little evidence here that perceptions 
about the political system affect authoritarian support.  The only pair that reaches a 
significant .100 correlation coefficient is the positive effect of failure to deliver the “basket” of 
political goods on indifference. 
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Table 3.5: Support for Authoritarianism and Politics in Africa 








Country is not 
governed very 
democratically 
-.061** -.021** .036** .049** 
Failure to deliver 
political goods of 
democracy 
.020** .052** .078** .100** 
Unlikely that you 
could influence 
national representative 
-.034** -.010 -.037** .029** 
Unsatisfied with 
democracy 




-.083** -.039** -.004 -.005 
Source: Afrobarometer 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 The World Values Survey offers a different set of political variables related to the state of 
democracy.  Questions asking how democratically the country is being governed as well as 
whether human rights are respected capture general democratic conditions.  These are 
supplemented by perceptions of the fairness of elections and whether elections are bought by the 
rich.  The final question used below looks at the degree to which the state is able to provide 
safety and security to its citizens.  This is a condition that was not investigated in the other 
regions but we should expect authoritarian support where democratic governments are failing to 
keep their people safe.  As with Latin American and Africa, positive correlations indicate that 
democratic deficits are driving authoritarian support or indifference. 
 The effect of political factors on military rule and rejection of democracy is weak and not 
always in the predicted direction.  A perception of lack of respect for human rights, lack of 
security and unfair elections all diminish the importance of democracy in the eyes of citizens, but 
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only by a small amount.  This indicates that poorly functioning democratic institutions are 
responsible for some indifference, although not at the levels found in Latin America. 
Table 8: Politics and Regime Support in Central and Eastern Europe 










the country being 
governed today 
-.092** .038** -.046** -.078** 
No respect for 
human rights in 
country 
.230** .050** .027* .040** 
Don’t feel secure 
in your 
neighborhood 
.036** -.026* .023 .050** 
Elections are not 
fair 
.227** .027* .055** .078** 
Elections are 
bought buy the 
rich 
.202** .027* .007 -.003 
Source: World Values Survey 2010-2014  
In Central and Eastern Europe support for a strong leader who does not have to bother 
with parliament or elections is the most popular authoritarian alternative.   According to this data, 
it is also the measure of authoritarian support that is best explained by the political context of the 
country and its progression toward democracy.  Poorly respected human rights, unfair elections 
and a perception that elections are bought by the rich are all strongly and significantly associated 
with support for strongman rule.  A perception of failing democratic institutions is causing a 
number of citizens to desire a strong central leader who can fix the broken system.  Furthermore, 
if citizens feel that elections are not functioning and giving them a voice, perhaps a benevolent 
strongman ruler would be better than a corrupt politician.  The effect of political factors on 
support for strongman rule is the most important evidence yet that politics does, in some cases, 
affect regime support. 
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The oddball case of Ukraine will be explored in a later chapter but it is worth noting that 
these general trends do not hold in that country.  Political variables are largely irrelevant to the 
high levels of authoritarian support in Ukraine.  Dropping Ukraine out of this analysis actually 
increases many of the correlation coefficients presented below for approval of strongman rule.   
Conclusions   
Much of the literature on democratic legitimacy has centered on the effect of political 
variables.  The main assertion has been that a successful delivery of democratic institutions will 
build support for those institutions.  The preceding investigation has taken these predictions and 
attempted to apply them to support for authoritarianism (presumably the opposite side of the 
coin). This chapter confirms that, as with economic variables, not all regions are created equal.  
There are significant differences in the relative importance of very similar political variables 
across Africa, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.  However, some generalizations 
are possible. 
Consistent with the findings of Marta Lagos, negative perceptions of the workings of 
democracy, as well as dissatisfaction with it, are linked to increasing indifference to regime type.  
This indifference is most pronounced in Latin America and present to a lesser degree in Africa 
and CEE.  In Latin America, weak democracy does seem to be driving a small number of people 
to authoritarian support as well.  Only in CEE do we find political variables clearly and strongly 
linked to support for authoritarianism, in the form of strongman rule. 
In Latin America and CEE, both objective and subjective measures confirm the 
importance of corruption as a small part of the explanation for authoritarian support.  Corrupt 
politics in Latin America drive citizens in nearly equal measures to authoritarian support and 
indifference.  While this is not the strongest finding, it is notably consistent across various modes 
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of measurement.  Similarly, in CEE, perceptions that money influences elections are a strong and 
significant predictor of support for strongman rule.   
Although democratic deficiencies cause a small amount of indifference in Africa, politics 
as a whole do not seem particularly important for explaining regime support in general.  The 
political variables employed for Africa offer no help in explaining authoritarian support in 
particular. 
 An important finding in this chapter is related to regime history.  It seems that a historical 
experience of highly repressive authoritarian rule in Latin America leads some individuals to say 
“never again.”  The weight of the past appears critical to understanding present assessments of 
different regime types.  This suggests that preferences for authoritarian rule are determined with 
an eye to past experience, even if it is only a distant memory. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that political factors offer more insights into 
authoritarian support than economic factors (with the possible exception of Africa).  However, 
democratic deficiencies tend to be much better predictors of indifference than support for 
autocracy. This may make sense, considering that if one is disappointed with a lack of freedom 
and voice, an authoritarian alternative does not seem like a likely candidate to provide it.  The 
example of the importance of corruption for explaining regime support in Latin America may 
indicate that the formulation of authoritarian support is carried out with reference to past 
experience with similar regimes.  Some Latin Americans might see democratic regimes as more 
corrupt than their authoritarian predecessors and see a return to previous institutions as a possible 
solution to this critical problem.  The next chapter will continue to explore the importance of 
previous experience with autocracy for determining authoritarian support in Latin America.   
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To conclude, it seems that democratic deficiencies alone are not likely to turn large 
portions of the population toward supporting illiberal regime types.  However, the small portion 
of individuals that do seem to make this shift, combined with the larger portion who become 
increasingly indifferent, could still provide an apt environment for an authoritarian regime to rise 
to power largely unopposed.  For this reason, political variables should be considered an 























Title Survey Question Responses 
Democracy has worsened Do you think that democracy 
in (country) has...? 
Improved, Remained the 
same, Worsened 
Failure to deliver the political 
“goods” of democracy 
What does democracy still 
need to do in your country?... 
Consolidate political parties, 
Guarantee social justice, 
Increase citizen participation, 
Reduce corruption, Increase 
transparency of the state 
0 (none mentioned) – 5 (all 
mentioned) 
Individual’s party’s ideas 
can’t make it to power 
Do you believe that the 
political sector which you 
support has the same 
opportunities to get into power 
as others? Or you don’t think 
it doesn’t have the same 
opportunities? 
Has the same opportunities, 
Does not have the same 
opportunities 
Unsatisfied with how 
democracy is working 
In general, would you say you 
are very satisfied, quite 
satisfied, not very satisfied or 
not at all satisfied with the 
working of the democracy in 
(country)? 
Very satisfied, Quite satisfied, 
Not very satisfied, Not at all 
satisfied 
The state cannot solve the 
problem of corruption 
To what extent do you think 
the state can solve... the 
problem of corruption? 
All of the problem, A large 
part of the problem, A small 
part of the problem, The state 
cannot solve the problem 
Dependent Variables 
Title Survey Question Responses 
Agree that Under some 
circumstances an authoritarian 
government can be preferable 
to a democratic one 
With which of the following 
statements do you 
agree most? 
Democracy is preferable to 
any other kind of government; 
Under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian government can 
be preferable to a democratic 
one 
Support for military rule Would you support a military 
government in replacement of 
a democratic one if things get 
very bad? Or would you not 
support a military government 
under any circumstance? 
I would support a military 
government in replacement of 
a democratic government if 
things get very bad; I would 
not support a military 
government under any 
circumstance 
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Disagree that democracy is the 
best form of government 
Do you strongly agree (1), 
agree (2), disagree (3) or 
strongly disagree (4) with the 
following statements? ... 
Democracy may have 
problems but it is the best 
system of government. 
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly disagree 
Indifference With which of the following 
statements do you 
agree most? 
“For people like me, it doesn’t 
matter whether we have a 
democratic or non-democratic 
regime” or “Don’t Know”; 




Title Survey Question Responses 
Country is not governed very 
democratically 
In your opinion how much of 
a democracy is Lesotho today? 
A full democracy; A 
democracy, but with minor 
problems; A democracy with 
major problems; Not a 
democracy  
Failure to deliver political 
goods of democracy 
In this country, how free are 
you: ... To say what you think, 
To join any political 
organization you want, To 
choose who to vote for 
without feeling pressured 
0 (not at all free/not very free 
for all) -  3 (somewhat 
free/completely free for all) 
Unlikely that you could 
influence national 
representative 
In your opinion, how likely is 
it that you could get together 
with others and make: ... Your 
representative to the National 
Assembly listen to your 
concerns about a matter of 
importance to the community? 
Not at all likely, Not very 
likely, Somewhat likely, Very 
likely 
Unsatisfied with democracy Overall, how satisfied are you 
with the way democracy 
works in Lesotho? Are you: 
Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, 
Not very satisfied, Not at all 
satisfied 
Government not handling 
corruption well 
How well or badly would you 
say the current government is 
handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard 
enough to say? 
Very badly, Fairly badly, 
Fairly well, Very well 
Dependent Variables 
Title Survey Question Responses 
Approve of one-party rule There are many ways to Strongly disapprove, 
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govern a country. Would you 
disapprove or approve of the 
following alternatives? ... 
Only one political party is 
allowed to stand for election 
and hold office. 
Disapprove, Neither approve 
or disapprove, Approve, 
Strongly approve 
Approve of military rule There are many ways to 
govern a country. Would you 
disapprove or approve of the 
following alternatives? ... The 
army comes in to govern the 
country. 
Strongly disapprove, 
Disapprove, Neither approve 
or disapprove, Approve, 
Strongly approve 
Preference for non-democratic 
government 
Which of these three 
statements is closest to your 
own opinion? 
Democracy is preferable to 
any other kind of government; 
In some circumstances, a non-
democratic government can be 
preferable. 
Indifference Which of these three 
statements is closest to your 
own opinion? 
For someone like me, it 
doesn’t matter what kind of 
government we have; any 
other response 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Independent Variables 
Title Survey Question Responses 
How democratically is the 
country being governed today 
And how democratically is 
this country being governed 
today?  
1 (not at all democratic) – 10 
(completely democratic) 
No respect for human rights in 
country 
How much respect is there for 
individual human rights 
nowadays in this country? Do 
you feel there is... 
A great deal of respect for 
individual human rights, 
Fairly much respect, Not 
much respect, No respect at all 
Don’t feel secure in your 
neighborhood 
Could you tell me how secure 
do you feel these days in your 
neighborhood ? 
Very secure, Quite secure, Not 
very secure, Not secure at all 
Elections are not fair In your view, how often do the 
following things occur in this 
country’s elections?  ... 
Election officials are fair 
Very often, Fairly often, Not 
often, Not at all often 
Elections are bought buy the 
rich 
In your view, how often do the 
following things occur in this 
country’s elections?  ... Rich 
people buy elections 
Very often, Fairly often, Not 
often, Not at all often 
Dependent Variables 
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Title Survey Question Responses 
Approve of strongman rule I'm going to describe various 
types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each 
as a way of governing this 
country...Having a strong 
leader who does not have to 
bother with parliament and 
elections. 
Very good, Fairly good, Fairly 
bad, Very bad 
Approve of military rule I'm going to describe various 
types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each 
as a way of governing this 
country...Having the army rule 
Very good, Fairly good, Fairly 
bad, Very bad 
Reject Democracy I'm going to describe various 
types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each 
as a way of governing this 
country...Having a democratic 
political system 
Very good, Fairly good, Fairly 
bad, Very bad 
Democracy not important How important is it for you to 
live in a country that is 
governed democratically? 

















Chapter 4: Culture, History, and Authoritarian Support 
 The scholarly debate around democratic and regime legitimacy has tended to center on 
the relative importance of economic and political factors.  However, the data from Chapters 2 
and 3 suggest that these two sets of explanatory variables cannot explain the entire picture alone. 
Some authors have—both implicitly and explicitly—pointed out cultural and historical variables 
that may influence the regime preferences of specific populations.  This chapter does not attempt 
a complete, in-depth investigation into the impact of the very complex and rich concepts of 
history and culture.  Rather, what follows will investigate several specific variables brought up in 
or related to the literature on democratic and authoritarian legitimacy.  First, I will use multiple 
measures to investigate the claim that certain countries may have cultural traits that are hostile to 
democracy.  Second, I will look for connections between levels of trust and authoritarian support.   
Culture 
 In The Third Wave, Samuel Huntington sums up the cultural argument: “A profoundly 
antidemocratic culture would impede the spread of democratic norms in the society, deny 
legitimacy to democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence 
and effective functioning of these institutions” (my emphasis).34  The legitimacy argument here 
is that where there is no Western culture and/or where there is some other culture hostile to 
democratic norms and behavior, support for democracy will be slow to develop.  We may 
assume that at least some of these non-democrats would have some other illiberal regime in mind 
as a preferable option.  While he does not fully back this argument, Huntington does point to 
Confucian culture as solidly anti-democratic and Islamic culture as at least problematic for the 
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development of a democratic culture.  In fact, some studies looking at Asia have confirmed this 
idea of a set of particular “asian values” that can undermine democratic legitimacy and lend 
legitimacy to autocrats.35 
 The focus of this investigation is on three regions not mentioned by Huntington: Latin 
America, Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe.  In Africa and Latin America, it would be 
difficult to pinpoint a specific cultural trait that is particularly hostile to democracy.  However, in 
the case of Latin America, some early observers pointed to authoritarian and hierarchical cultural 
traits that could undermine democratic support.36  In Africa, far from discovering some united 
cultural identity, an investigation carried out by Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-
Boadi concludes that it is “a culturally contested continent.”  In his discussion of culture, 
Huntington does mention the possibility of a cultural impediment to democracy in the former 
Soviet Union.  He suggests that countries like Ukraine, Romania and Estonia were part of a 
unique cultural experience that was more influenced by the Czarist and Ottoman Empires, 
Othodoxy, and Islam.37  Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer investigated this idea by measuring the 
impact of religion (secular vs. religious), remoteness (rural vs. urban) and the importance of 
nationality to an individual’s regime preferences in this region.  They found only a very weak 
connection between these cultural variables and support for authoritarian alternative regimes.38  
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Despite the mixed record in the literature on the potential impact of culture for authoritarian and 
democratic support, it may still be valuable to probe these variables in slightly different ways. 
One potential way to quantify “Western culture” comes from Ronald Inglehart and 
Christian Welzel’s index of emancipative values (EVs), which measure citizens’ democratic 
orientations in various countries.  EVs give “priority to equality over patriarchy, tolerance over 
conformity, autonomy over authority, and expression over security.”39  Since this index is based 
on the World Values Survey, we are limited to exploring only the countries included in the 2011 
survey.  Further limiting the amount of data points, but in the interest of consistency, I have 
included only countries that were in the initial lists for the three regions.  Still, this data serves as 
a good starting point for an investigation of culture.   
Welzel and Inglehart find a strong correlation between these emancipative values and 
levels of democracy across the world.  They suggest that this is due to a high priority placed on 
democratic values that translates into mass demands for liberal institutions.40   We have good 
reason to expect that the inverse would be true as well.   Preference for patriarchy, conformity, 
authority and security should translate into a desire for stable authoritarian rule.  The charts 
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 Chart 4.1: Emancipative Values vs. Support for Military Rule
r = -0.16 
Chart 4.2: Emancipative Values vs. Support for Strongman Rule
r = 0.04 








Charts 4.1 and 4.2 show the relationship between emancipative values and two different 
measures of authoritarian support across the three regions under investigation.  Support for 
strongman rule was determined by the percentage of respondents in each country that said it was 
either very good or fairly good to have a “strong leader who does not have to bother with 
parliament or elections.”  The proportion saying that having the army govern was fairly good or 
very good determined support for military rule.41   Surprisingly, there is very little relationship at 
all between both measures of support for authoritarian rule and emancipative values.   As an 
example, Ghana is an outlier due to its extremely low emancipative values, indicating that 
democratic institutions should not be compatible with the culture.  However, there is very little 
support for authoritarian alternatives in the country.  Ghanaians strongly support democracy with 
95.6% saying democracy is either a fairly good or a very good regime type for their country.  It 
seems clear that seemingly authoritarian cultural traits are not a guarantee of support for 
authoritarian alternatives, nor are they an impassible barrier to support for democracy.   
To further probe this unexpected finding, I employ a similar variable, found variously 
worded in several international surveys, that measures individuals’ priorities at the national level.  
For example, the Afrobarometer asks respondents to list the first and second most important area 
of focus from four options: “maintaining order in the nation,” “improving economic conditions 
for the poor,” “giving people more say in government decisions,” and “protecting peoples right 
to live freely.”  The first two aims are certainly not authoritarian in nature, but an individual that 
picks the two answers together as their first and second choice may be more predisposed to the 
temptation of a charismatic autocrat promising economic reform and an end to a violent or 
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dangerous political environment.  Table 4.1 examines the level of these kinds of “passive 
authoritarian values” across three regions in two different sets of countries determined by their 
levels of authoritarian support.  The percentages listed for Africa show the proportion of those 
surveyed who selected both non-democratic goals.  In Latin America, passive authoritarian 
values were determined by the percentage who chose fighting rising prices and maintaining order 
rather than giving people more voice in policy decisions and improving freedom of speech.  For 
these measures I had to rely on the World Values Survey, which significantly decreased the 
number of cases.  Additionally, some of the measures included below from Latin America were 
from survey years other than the 2011 survey used to determine authoritarian support.  However, 
based on other measures contained in the WVS, authoritarian support in these countries has 
remained fairly steady over the last few years.  In order to more closely investigate this region’s 
selected case, Guatemala, I included data from the same survey question asked several years 
earlier.  The fact that support for a “strong ruler who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections” was at 56.4% in that survey indicates that authoritarian support was equally if not 
more present in that survey year.  The same measure of passive authoritarian values used in Latin 
America was used for CEE. 
The data presented in Table 4.1 demonstrates some significant regional differences.  In 
Latin America, populations with higher authoritarian support tended to place non-democratic 
concerns of security and the economy above more liberal goals.  Demonstrating exactly the 
opposite, African countries with higher authoritarian support were more likely to choose 
democratic goals.  This is an interesting and unexpected observation and may reflect differing 
priorities in the two regions.   
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Table 4.1: Passive Authoritarian Values and Support for Authoritarianism 
 Case Study Countries With 
Populations 








































 Countries With Populations More 
Willing to Accept Authoritarianism 
Countries With Populations Less 









Ukraine Romania Poland Estonia 
78.6% 65.8% 60.6% 69.7% 
Sources: World Values Survey, Afrobarometer 
The cases chosen for Latin America and Africa follow regional trends.  Guatemalans had 
extremely high passive authoritarian values in 2004, higher than any other country in the survey.  
Conversely, Basotho have the second lowest passive authoritarian values among the countries 
observed in the region.  This demonstrates a difference in the demand for democracy in these 
regions, but does not help as much for explaining support for authoritarianism.  This is especially 
true in the case of Africa, where low passive authoritarian values (meaning at least some demand 
for democracy) should, but do not translate into rejection of authoritarian alternatives.  Perhaps 
Africans see democracy—rather than authoritarianism as we might expect—as a solution to 
problems of security and the economy.  In Latin America, a preference for non-democratic 
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country goals may help explain a small part of the picture.  However, the differences between 
country groups narrowly miss statistical significance at the .1 level in both regions. 
In CEE, there is a much higher demand for non-democratic over democratic goals across 
all four countries.  These levels are generally about double those found in Latin America and do 
not vary greatly among the countries.  However, it is interesting to note that Ukraine shows the 
highest preference for non-democratic goals.  Perhaps the particular importance of stability and 
the economy for Ukrainians contributes to a preference for some quicker, more efficient non-
democratic regime.  This will be examined further in Chapter 5. 
Trust 
Another important cultural factor that can facilitate the emergence of democracy, and 
may be relevant to these regions, is trust.  Marta Lagos has found evidence of a “regional 
heritage of distrust” 42 in Latin America that could prove detrimental to the growth of democratic 
norms. On the contrary, in Africa, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi found no relationship 
between interpersonal trust and support for democracy.  However, they did find that more 
trusting individuals are actually slightly more likely to support authoritarian alternatives, a 
relationship that they attribute to naivety or innocence that can be taken advantage of by 
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Table 4.2: Trust and Authoritarian Support 
 Case Study Countries With 
Populations 








































 Countries With Populations More 
Willing to Accept Authoritarianism 
Countries With Populations Less 







Ukraine Romania Poland Estonia 
23.1% 7.7% 22.2% 39% 
 
 Table 4.2 shows the effect of levels of trust on authoritarian support in general across all 
three regions.  In Africa, my findings support those of Bratton and his colleagues that lower 
levels of trust actually seem to decrease authoritarian support.  It may be that, in this case, a 
certain level of suspicion can help some individuals avoid being deceived by the alluring 
promises of an autocrat.  The same trend is visible in Latin America but to a fairly 
inconsequential degree.  The case in Central and Eastern Europe is similarly inconclusive.  
Taken as a whole, the two countries with higher popular support for authoritarianism have lower 
levels of trust but this is driven mainly by the extremely low level in Romania.  In that country, 
only 7.7% of those surveyed trust other citizens.  Trust in Ukraine (high authoritarian support) 
and Poland (low authoritarian support) is roughly the same.  Similar to Latin America, this 
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region appears to have very low levels of trust between its citizens, but at these extremes it does 
not appear to affect regime preference. 
 Taken as a whole, the cultural explanations explored above offer only tentative, 
incomplete explanations of variance in regime support.  Emancipative values, designed to 
measure democratic tendencies, are a surprisingly weak predictor of support for illiberal regimes.  
In Africa, passive authoritarian values (the proportion of a population that prefer non-democratic 
goals over democratic goals for their country) do not cause support for authoritarianism.  This is 
important as it suggests that democracy may be seen as capable of handling the basic issues of 
security and the economy.   
Preferences for stability and economic growth over deepening democracy might still have 
some effect in the other regions, especially at the extremes as demonstrated in Guatemala and 
Ukraine.  A closer look at Ukraine offered in the next chapter seems to indicate that culture may 
have a distinct effect in different countries and regions.  Finally, trust is not a significant 
predictor of authoritarian support but it may be somewhat relevant in Africa where lower levels 
of trust are associated with lower authoritarian support, perhaps due to increased cynicism.  
Overall, the evidence that culture determines authoritarian support uniformly across these 
regions is underwhelming. 
Conclusions 
 This chapter began with the assumption that cultural traits might drive countries to 
greater authoritarian support. Although this topic could merit another full volume of research, a 
cursory investigation carried out here suggested that this is not the case.  Ronald Inglehart and 
Christian Welzel’s emancipative values do not appear related to authoritarian support.  Looking 
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more specifically at citizens’ preferences however did reveal some interesting differences.  In 
Latin America, countries that put a higher priority on economic stability and security tended to 
have higher levels of authoritarian support.  Again, Africa refuses to fit the mold and presented 
the opposite trends.  This seems to indicate that some Africans feel that democracy, security and 
stability can coexist.  However, these non-democratic priorities were only slightly different 
between the country groups and did not attain statistical significance.  This chapter was unable to 
find much evidence of an effect of culture on support for autocracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
Overall, culture seems to be a weak predictor of authoritarian support, especially 
considering the closeness of many of the independent and dependent variables in this analysis.   
However, the next chapter, looking specifically at Ukraine, will demonstrate that culture is not 
totally irrelevant, and might even be central to explaining authoritarian support in the culturally 













Chapter 5: Authoritarian Support in Ukraine 
On November 22, 2004, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians gathered at Independence 
Square in Kyiv to protest falsified election results that were set to return the incumbent president, 
Viktor Yanukovych, to power.  These mobilizations were not confined to the capital and could 
be found all across the country.  The Orange Revolution, as the protests were called, has been 
heralded as a prime example of “people power” where citizens took to the streets to demand 
democracy.44   
However, survey data collected by the World Values Survey in Ukraine casts a dark 
shadow on this hopeful movement and the brief progress toward democracy that it brought.  
Despite fairly high levels of democratic support (only 15% saying democracy is a bad regime 
choice), a whopping 71.3% of surveyed Ukrainians approved of “having a strong leader who 
does not have to bother with parliament and elections.”  That number was 51.8% in 2006 with 
nearly 20% of survey-takers responding with “I don’t know.”  What explains this majority 
preference for what I will term “strongman rule,” even in the context of a seemingly democratic 
mass uprising?   
This investigation will follow the framework laid out in the previous chapters in order to 
solve this puzzle, focusing on the 2011 survey data.45  The first section will explore economic 
factors.  I find that economic changes since Ukraine’s transition to democracy are unhelpful for 
explaining regime preference.  The next section looks at political factors focusing on the current 
regime’s delivery of freedom and democracy.  These political factors help explain relatively low 
levels of support for military rule but they offer little to explain the more impressive levels of 
support for strongman rule.  Finally, I will explore various cultural traits of the country.  I find 
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that aspects of culture are in large part responsible for the contradictory narrative of regime 
support in Ukraine. 
The Economy 
If, as Adam Przeworski predicts46, regime support will be generated by how new 
institutions stack up to popular expectations, Ukraine would stand out as a case where poor 
economic performance would be likely to have engendered popular preferences for a return to 
comparatively stable authoritarian rule.  Ukraine never fully recovered from its transition to a 
market economy in the 1990s.  Between 1989 and 1999 it experienced the worst economic 
collapse of all the former-Soviet countries.47  Today its economy is only ¾ the size it was in 
1989 and it has faced continually poor conditions with only a short exception of GDP growth in 
the early 2000s.  Not only did the transition to democracy occur simultaneously with these far-
reaching economic reforms, but democracy itself is somewhat implicated in the country’s failure 
to piece together a working economy.  Frequent changing of government has undermined any 
one administration’s ability to pursue a coherent reform program.48  These circumstances might 
seem to present the perfect environment for a charismatic leader to ride in and save the day by 
providing direction and stability.  But does the economic situation lead Ukrainians to support this 
kind of authoritarian solution?   
Chart 6.1 investigates this question by exploring the degree to which satisfaction with 
one’s household financial situation affects their preference for a strong leader who does not have 
to bother with parliament or elections.  We would expect that as individuals feel that their living 
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 conditions are worse, they will be more likely to support this kind of authoritarian intervention 
into a system where democracy does not appear able to help them.  In general
declines, there is a slight trend toward increasing support for this kind of strongman rule.  
However, this trend is notably small and high authoritarian support persists even among those 
who are completely satisfied. 
Chart 6.1: Strongman Rule vs. Home Financial Situation in Ukraine
Source: World Values Survey 2011
 
In order to further probe Przeworki’s proposition, keeping in mind that two decades have 
passed since Ukraine’s transition to democracy, the following will begin to investiga
the effect of economics on authoritarian support is caused by disappointment with democracy.  If, 
as proposed above, defection from democracy can be traced to disappointment with its ability to 
improve living conditions, we might expect this eff
, as satisfaction 
 
 





conditions under the previous regime.  Those who are old enough to have lived through both 
authoritarian and democratic institutions are better poised to judge democracy in light of its 
alternatives.  These individuals would have experienced the harsh economic downturn that 
occurred along with the shift to democratic rule.  Obviously there are many possible intervening 
factors (for example: levels of repression, political performance, freedom and rule of law) so I 
will look for strong associations.  
Table 6.1 presents correlations between satisfaction with one’s living conditions and 
support for a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections.  I have 
included the same measures for Estonia to determine how Ukraine stacks up to another country 
with a more successful post-communist economic experience.  Both surveys were taken in 2011 
when each country was beginning to recover from the 2008 recession. 
Table 6.1: Democracy in Comparison 










Ukraine .045* .032 .052* .049 
Estonia .089** .033 .108** .113** 
* significant at the .05 level 
** significant at the .01 level 
Source: World Values Survey 2011 
 
In both Ukraine and Estonia, there is some evidence for the idea that economic factors 
become more relevant for regime preference if the individual is old enough to have lived under 
another regime type.   However, the effect of economics remains fairly low in Ukraine across age 
groups.  Interestingly, economics seems to be a much more important consideration for 
 79
explaining authoritarian support in Estonia, where economic growth has been better and inflation 
has been kept in check.  
 There are some limitations to this investigation including the lack of a wide range of 
survey questions related to the economy in Ukraine.  It remains possible that some economic 
factors could influence regime support.  However, taken as a whole, the evidence above seems to 
suggest that Ukraine’s uniquely poor economic experience under democratic institutions tells us 
very little about the country’s high levels of authoritarian support.  Financial frustration may tip 
the scales for a few fence-sitters as demonstrated in Chart 6.1 but support for non-democratic 
rule remains remarkably high no matter the economic situation.  
Politics 
 Along with its poor economic experience, Ukraine has made only limited progress 
toward consolidating democracy.  Numerous problems plague the country’s political institutions, 
and the literature (as well as the findings from Chapter 3) suggest that this should be relevant to 
regime legitimacy.  This line of thinking assumes that Ukrainians, having experienced a deficient 
form of democracy, are likely to reject this type of regime in favor of an authoritarian alternative.  
Several specific deficiencies could be identified as potential drivers of this kind of authoritarian 
support, including disrespect for human rights, failure to provide safety and security, election 
irregularities and widespread corruption.   We expect to find perceptions of democratic failures 
in these areas associated with an embrace of authoritarian alternatives. This is explored in Table 
6.2 below. 
 Perhaps the most notable finding here is that support for military rule is fairly well 
explained by perceptions of the political system whereas support for democracy and support for 
strongman rule continue to prove evasive.  A perception of undemocratic governance and 
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disrespect for human rights leads some Ukrainians to support what would essentially be a 
military coup.   A much smaller portion appears to be driven to support for strongman rule by a 
general perception that Ukraine is not being governed democratically. 
 A perception that elections are not fair is also associated with higher support for both 
authoritarian alternatives.  This is not surprising considering the country’s history of troubled 
elections.  In fact, after a lengthy run of fairly clean elections following the Orange Revolution, a 
set of 2010 elections (carried out a year before this survey) demonstrated serious flaws.49  These 
flaws may have driven some Ukrainians to increasingly see military or strongman rule as a 
viable option, although they do not appear to have undermined democratic support.  
 Corruption is a persistent problem in Ukraine, which ranks 142nd out of 175 states on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.50  Wealthy business owners are 
presumed to profit from close ties to political leadership.51  These real and perceived influences 
on politicians could be expected to undermine the legitimacy of the system.  While the World 
Values Survey generally lacks detailed questions dealing with corruption in Ukraine, it does ask 
if respondents feel that the wealthy have inordinate influence on who wins elections.  This 
should capture at least a part of discontent with corruption, if it exists.  Table 6.2 shows that a 
perception of inordinate influence of the wealthy in elections undermines democratic support and 
increases support for a military regime.  However, it surprisingly has no effect on support for a 
strong leader who does not have to deal with parliament or elections (which has much wider 
support in Ukraine).   Taken as a whole, the responses from this survey indicate that political 
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deficiencies are driving support for military rule to some degree but high levels of support for 
strongman rule remain a mystery.  I turn next to political culture in Ukraine 
Table 6.2: Political Factors and Regime Support in Ukraine 
 Support for 
Strongman Rule 







-.040* -.128** .039 
No Respect for 
Human Rights 
.012 .144** -.032 
Don’t Feel Secure in 
Neighborhood 
.042 -.014 -.043 
Elections Are Not 
Fair 
.090** .104** -.032 
Rich People Buy 
Elections 
.015 .135** -.055* 
Source: World Values Survey 2011 
Culture 
 In many studies of Ukraine, a great deal of attention is given to societal and cultural 
cleavages within the country.52  The main cleavage has its roots in a historical division of the 
country between Tsarist Russia (occupying much of modern day central and eastern Ukraine) 
and Austria and Hungary (western Ukraine).  Ukrainians in these two regions had vastly 
different historical experiences.  Perhaps most relevant to the discussion of regime support is the 
fact that those living in the eastern portion faced harsh autocratic rule at the hands of the Russian 
Tsar while western Ukrainians were introduced to democratic institutions as early as the late 19th 
century.53  This cultural divide has been used to explain political values in Ukraine and other 
post-Soviet countries.   
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It has often been argued that Russian culture is characterized by several authoritarian 
qualities including fatalism, intolerance, orthodox religion and the importance of the group over 
the individual.54  Most importantly, Russian culture has been noted for its preference for strong 
leadership linked to the traditional peasant culture and the necessity of strong central rule to 
govern the country’s vast territory.55  Conversely, Ukrainian culture, particularly in the west, is 
more often linked to liberal European values.  Therefore, we have good reason to suspect that the 
significant preference for strongman rule in Ukraine is a remnant of Russian culture and we 
should find it at its strongest among those who identify as ethnically Russian, speak Russian or 
live in eastern Ukraine.   
The charts below demonstrate that this is not the case.  In fact, Russians and eastern 
Ukrainians are very slightly less supportive of strongman rule across the board.  The trend of 
support for this authoritarian option seems to cross regional and historical boundaries, 
encompassing the entire country.  This might lead one to reject the idea that culture is 
influencing authoritarian support, but a closer look at national-level trends reveals that that 
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 Chart 6.2: Support for Strongman Rule vs. Ethnicity
Source: World Values Survey 2011
 
Chart 6.3: Support for Strongman Rule vs. Language










 Chart 6.4: Support for Strongman Rule vs. Ethnicity
Source: World Values Survey 2011
 
Using Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart’s “emancipative 
Ukraine is characterized by a relatively authoritarian culture.  Emancipative values are scaled 
from 0-1 and countries or individuals with high levels are characterized by giving priority to 
“equality over patriarchy, tolerance 
over security.”56  While countries like Estonia and Poland that reject authoritarian alternatives 
receive average ratings of .48 and .46 respectively, Ukraine’s average was only .40, the same as 
Russia’s.  This suggests that we cannot reject the idea that Russian culture is somewhat more 
prone to authoritarianism.  It also seems to indicate that Ukrainian culture may be closer to 
Russia than to Europe with respect to authoritarian and democratic values
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values” index, we find that 
over conformity, autonomy over authority, and expression 
. 




 Chart 6.5 shows the effect of emancipative values on support for strongman rule, 
demonstrating that cultural differences have a stronger impact in Ukraine than in Estonia or 
Poland.  In Ukraine, a shift from the highest to the lowest level of emancipativ
corresponds with a nearly 60-point drop in the percentage of Ukrainians who support strongman 
rule.  This measure of culture appears to be a factor in all three countries included but it remains 
particularly important for Ukraine, where authoritar
Chart 6.5: Support for Strongman Rule vs. Emancipative Values
Source: World Values Survey 2011
 
Drilling down even further on the nature of regime support in Ukraine sheds light on the 
huge percentage of the population that approves of strongman rule.  The data from the 2011 
World Values Survey in Ukraine reveals a striking trend: Ukrainians do not necessarily see 
democracy and rule by a strong leader ignoring elections and parliament as mutually exclusive.  
e values 







Table 6.3 shows the correlations between support for democracy and support for strongman rule 
in several Central and Eastern European states.  We should expect to see that individuals who 
support democracy as a regime type would widely reject strongman rule.  Instead we find that 
this is only the case in Estonia and Poland, the two countries that more willingly reject this 
authoritarian alternative.  In Ukraine there is no association between the two.  In fact, 59% of 
Ukrainians approve of both democracy and strongman rule as viable regime options for the 
country.  In Romania there is a significant correlation linking both types of regime support. 
Table 6.3: Support for Democracy vs. Support for Strongman Rule 




and Support for 
Strongman Rule 
-.038 .082* -.140** -.187** 
Source: World Values Survey 2011 
 
Support for strongman rule is also closely tied with support for the government in power.  
This seems to indicate that many Ukrainians are comfortable with their political leaders taking 
full advantage of and consolidating their position of power, as many have done.  The Chart 
below demonstrates that this is true not only in 2011 as Viktor Yanukovych returned to the 
political scene and began to recentralize presidential power, but also in 2006, just two years after 
the mass uprising during the Orange Revolution.  At this point, Viktor Yushchenko was still in 
power after being elected in a fair electoral transfer of power.  This indicates that for some, a 
vote for Yushchenko was not a vote for deepening democracy per se but rather a vote for a 
“better” strongman ruler. 
These trends in mass political values are somewhat reflected in Ukraine’s political 
institutions.  Political parties in Ukraine tend to be used as personal vehicles by their leaders 
 rather than adhering to coherent platforms or ideologies.
political institutions, it seems unlikely that we will see significant progress toward democracy 
and institutionalization of checks and balances against a traditionally strong Ukrainian president.  
This is certainly a surprising finding considering the democratic excitement that surrounded the 
Orange Revolution.  We will have to wait to see what changes are brought b
recent developments of mass protests and civil war.
Chart 6.6: Strongman Rule vs. Confidence in Government
Source: World Values Survey 2011
 
Conclusion 
 The Orange Revolution in Ukraine brought a great deal of optimism and it seemed to 
demonstrate a thriving democratic culture in a weakly democratic holdout country.  However, 
survey data casts doubt on this interpretation showing that high levels of support for 
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authoritarianism persist despite mass mobilization in favor of democracy.  In particular, large 
majorities are in favor of a regime where a strong leader ignores parliament and is not subject to 
elections.  This chapter sought to explain this puzzle building on the framework of the preceding 
chapters. 
 Economic and political variables offer little help in explaining high levels of support for 
strongman rule in Ukraine.  Survey data showed that satisfaction with one’s living conditions is 
only weakly associated with rejection of this autocratic alternative.  Various measures of the 
success and failings of democracy itself offered very little help.  These political variables did 
however prove useful for explaining varying levels of support for military rule.   
 Culture stands out as a central factor in explaining regime support in Ukraine.  Welzel 
and Inglehart’s Emancipative values show that the country is characterized by a political culture 
closer to Russia than Estonia or Poland.  Interestingly, unlike many aspects of Ukrainian politics, 
authoritarian support cannot be divided cleanly into ethnic, linguistic or regional categories.  
Support for strongman rule seems to have penetrated each corner of the country.  What’s more, 
this authoritarian support is not disconnected and may even be an important part of support for 
democracy in Ukraine.  There is compelling evidence here that many Ukrainians desire both 
democracy and a strong leader who does not have to deal with it.  Whether these popular 
preferences can be reconciled is uncertain and may help explain some of the instability and weak 
institutionalization of the country’s democracy.  What will be brought by newer developments in 
the country is uncertain, but the cultural source of authoritarian support in Ukraine would seem 





Chapter 6: Authoritarian Support in Guatemala and Nicaragua 
Democracy is struggling to take root in two Central American countries, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala.  Both received a score of 4.0 from Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World 
measure in 2011, recognizing them as only partly free.  Widespread corruption wreaks havoc on 
democratic institutions and diminishes citizen trust in both countries.  Transparency International 
ranked Guatemala 120th and Nicaragua 134th of 180 countries in its 2011 report on Corruption 
Perceptions.  Cases of graft continue to reach to the highest levels of government and journalists 
are increasingly fearful of repercussions for taking on controversial stories.58   In both countries, 
civil society faces harassment, rights guarantees are not always respected for indigenous 
communities and violence against women is prevalent.59   
Weak institutions are unable (or officials are unwilling) to address deep socioeconomic 
issues that have persisted for decades.  First among these are the highest levels of poverty in the 
region.  The percentage below the national poverty line was 53.7% in Guatemala and 42.5% in 
Nicaragua in 2011 and 2009 respectively.60  Most estimates put one of these two countries as the 
most impoverished in Central America.  This is compounded by a high concentration of wealth 
in the hands of the economic elite.  Both countries remain underdeveloped and dependent on the 
international economy, making the poor even more vulnerable.  Beyond politics and economic 
issues, both Nicaragua and Guatemala have very young populations, roughly 72% literacy rates, 
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a similar proportion of the population living in cities (57.5% in Nicaragua compared to 49.8% in 
Guatemala) and the average citizen spends 11 years in school.61   
Despite many similarities however, these two countries differ significantly in the levels 
of their populations’ preference for authoritarian rule.  Based on survey data described below, 
Guatemalan citizens appear much more willing to accept some form of authoritarian rule 
compared with Nicaraguans.   
Using the simplest measure, Latinobarómetro data from a survey carried out in 2011 
shows that 24.7% of Guatemalans would support an authoritarian government under some 
circumstances compared with 17.8% of Nicaraguans.  The same survey found that 36.7% in 
Guatemala disagreed that “democracy may have problems but it is still the best form of 
government,” compared with only 16.2% in Nicaragua.  Adding depth to that finding is a 
separate survey carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2010 that 
asks the same question but with a 7-point scale of agreement rather than simple categorical 
answers.  According to this survey, in Guatemala, a tiny 17.93% “very much agree” that 
democracy is better than any other form of government compared to 44.38% in Nicaragua.  
These disparities certainly point to a stronger willingness to embrace regime alternatives in 
Guatemala.  This finding persists (and is even amplified) when observing attitudes toward a 
specific regime alternative; military rule.  Support for the prospect of a “military government in 
replacement of a democratic one if things got very bad” reaches 56.6% in Guatemala compared 
with only 19.9% in Nicaragua.  What explains these differences in authoritarian support?  Many 
of the factors identified in previous chapters offer little to help explain this puzzle.  The countries 
share similar political systems, economic conditions and legacies of repression. 
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The following analysis suggests three main differences that are driving disparities in 
regime legitimacy. First, the experience of social revolution in Nicaragua (not present in 
Guatemala) seems to have contributed to comparatively high levels of democratic support and 
slightly lower levels of authoritarian support.  Second, the presence of large indigenous 
population in Guatemala may generate resistance to their full inclusion by the traditionally 
powerful racial groups.  Thirdly, high levels of crime and violence in Guatemala as compared to 
Nicaragua appear to generate desire for authoritarian solutions.  
Political and Economic Legacies 
 A review of the history of the two countries under observation will help put future 
developments in context and recognize underlying currents in politics.  I argue that although 
Nicaragua and Guatemala have diverging histories, they share a number of important historical 
legacies that continue to shape politics today.  Among these are the development of a plantation 
society, a history of authoritarianism, strong foreign influence, socioeconomic crisis, peasant and 
labor resistance, and harsh repression. 
During the colonial and post-independence period, both countries developed as plantation 
societies eventually producing primarily coffee.  This brought with it a large peasant class that 
suffered from encroachment and exploitation by a land-hungry elite. Economic conditions for 
this segment of society continue to be dismal and the agricultural sector in both countries is still 
important.  Additionally, the integration of the two countries into the international economy 
made the peasant classes particularly vulnerable to global economic shifts and crises. 
The 20th century in both countries was characterized by harsh authoritarian rule and 
strong foreign (mostly US) influence.  From roughly 1871-1944 Guatemala was ruled by a series 
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of military dictators aligned with the coffee oligarchy and foreign investors.62  The October 
Revolution in 1944 heralded in 10 years of democracy that brought social programs and land 
reform to the country for the first time in its post-conquest history.  However, this brief interlude 
was ended by a CIA organized ouster of the sitting president that led to years of harsh military 
rule and civil war.  The end of this democratic period in Guatemala also meant the dismantling of 
the reforms that had been gained by it.  Foreign influence was even more overt in Nicaragua 
where the US physically occupied the country from to 1912 to the 1930s.  The exit of the US 
army brought about the decades-long rule of the corrupt and repressive Somoza family.   
Elite rule and growing international demand for coffee led to a worsening situation for 
the rural poor in both countries.  Economic conditions declined for peasants and the working-
class while rich landowners grew wealthier.  Several attempts at organized resistance occurred in 
both countries including the October Revolution, mentioned previously, and a period of 
indigenous organization and insurgency during the 70s and 80s in Guatemala.  In Nicaragua, the 
rebellion of guerilla leader Augusto Nicolás Sandino brought about the armed conflict that 
resulted in the end of foreign occupation of the country.  The next rebellion, some 30 years later, 
would take Sandino’s name and build upon his strategy with considerable success.  This 
Sandinista rebellion will be discussed further on.  What unites all of these examples, as well as 
smaller-scale, more peaceful peasant organization, is that they were often met with harsh, violent 
repression from the ruling regimes.   
Despite many shared historical legacies, including harsh repression that should have 
generated distaste for authoritarian rule in both countries, differences in authoritarian support 
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persist.  Clearly there are more factors at play including, perhaps, the point of departure for 
Guatemala and Nicaragua’s shared history; social revolution in Nicaragua. 
Social Revolution vs. Protracted Civil War 
 The histories of Nicaragua and Guatemala experienced a significant divergence in 1979 
when revolutionaries in Nicaragua, grouped under the FSLN (the Sandinistas), forced Anastasio 
Somoza DeBayle into exile and took control of the government.  Nicaragua had experienced a 
social revolution, uniting laborers, businesses, students, opposition parties and the Catholic 
Church against the ruling family.  Guatemala, never managing to unite such a strong opposition, 
saw only an increasingly brutal civil war as the insurgency there was met with the growth of 
repressive institutions.  Still, civil war in Guatemala does not make the country particularly 
exceptional.  In fact, following the revolution in 1979, Nicaragua faced a similarly violent civil 
war, as did El Salvador in the 80s and 90s.  The factor that differentiates the two countries in this 
case is the unique experience of revolution in Nicaragua that never occurred in Guatemala.  
Perhaps this revolutionary experience left a lasting mark on the country that may account for its 
lower levels of authoritarian support.  I will explore two possible manners through which the 
popular revolution may have affected authoritarian support in Nicaragua: the promotion of 
democratic norms and beliefs that undermine support for illiberal regimes and a Sandinista 
education program that demonized of the previous regime. 
 The revolution in Nicaragua brought efforts to improve health, widen education, fairly 
distribute land, and empower local mobilization in a new form of grassroots democracy.  While 
subsequent regimes shifted away from these reforms, it was nothing compared to the complete 
reversal experienced in Guatemala after the brief democratic interlude brought on by the October 
Revolution.  Guatemala’s two reformist leaders during this period also made efforts to widen 
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education, promote public health and encourage labor and peasant organization.  The early 1950s 
saw the redistribution of farmland to 100,000 peasants.63  However, the US-backed coup in 1954 
brought to power Colonel Castillo Armas, who undertook the complete dismantling of these 
reforms.  As one account puts it: “[w]ith ferocious anti-Communist propaganda, the 
counterrevolution dismantled the labor and peasant movements, killed and jailed thousands, 
repressed political parties, revoked the Agrarian Reform Law, and returned confiscated lands to 
their former owners.”64  Additionally, this brief democratic period occurred more than half a 
century ago in what may now be a distant past. 
While the Sandinista regime was not the perfect model for democracy, it must have at 
least felt democratic compared to years of repressive rule.  And that democratic experience led to 
some important lasting changes, possibly demonstrating to citizens that democracy can make a 
real difference.  Additionally, one should not underestimate the ideological power of the mass 
mobilization that brought about revolution.  The combination of the experience of revolution and 
the realization that democracy may be able to solve the country’s problems could certainly be 
expected to raise support for a liberal regime, thereby diminishing authoritarian support.  Adding 
to a mixed literature on the topic, John A. Booth and Patricia Bayer Richard found, using a 
comparative lens, that the experience of revolution in Nicaragua left a lasting impact on levels of 
leftist identification, involvement in educational groups and the way that communal groups 
mobilize people into political campaigns.65  It did not, they argue, have an impressive impact on 
electoral participation or, somewhat surprisingly, communal organization on its own.  They also 
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note that the revolution must have led to greater support for democratic values in society, 
although without much evidence to support this claim.  
A final reason that we may expect lower authoritarian support in Nicaragua has to do 
with the educational reforms pursued by the Sandinista regime in the wake of the revolution.  
Education reform was a central aspect of the Sandinista project and efforts to improve literacy 
began right away.  This education program was, at least in part, ideologically driven and propped 
up the FSLN regime at the expense of prior rulers. As one observer puts it, “Sandinista rhetoric 
and heroes were promoted through textbooks, and reaction was often particularly harsh about the 
militarism and violence depicted in teaching materials.”66  The opportunity of the Sandinista’s to 
“rewrite history”—a history that would certainly portray the Somoza regime in a very harsh 
light—could further reduce the number of individuals that would want to return to that kind of 
rule. 
 In sum, the experience of revolution may be expected to have mobilized a democratic 
citizenry and demonstrated the utility of democratic institutions. It also may have played a part in 
inducing fear of returning to the past regime through a mass education campaign.  Chart 5.1 
investigates these first two claims further by comparing levels of support for democracy over a 
15-year period across Central America.  Staying consistent with Booth and Richard’s 
comparative framework, in order to ensure that higher levels of support in Nicaragua can be 
traced to its unique experience of social revolution, I have included two other Central American 
countries, El Salvador and Honduras, in this analysis.  El Salvador’s political experience was 
similar to Guatemala’s with a lengthy civil war during the late 1900s.  Honduras escaped this 
level of conflict but its population still lived under authoritarian institutions during this period.  
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 Nicaragua was the only country to experience a successful revolution so if the predicti
outlined above prove correct, we should see the highest levels of democratic support there.
Chart 5.1: Democratic Support in Central America
Source: Latinobarómetro 2011 
 
In general, Nicaragua does display higher average support for democracy across the 
period observed.  However, the difference is somewhat limited with a 57.4% average in 
Nicaragua over the 15-year period compared to 53.6%, 50.4%, and 40.3% averages in El 
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala respectively.  Additionally, Chart 5.1 shows some variation 
over time with Nicaragua at times falling below the other Central American countries in terms of 
democratic support.  Guatemala continues to be an outlier with far a
democratic support in the region.  
Now the question becomes whether the slightly elevated levels of support for democracy 
in Nicaragua reflect a rejection of authoritarian rule or simply lower levels of indifference to 
 







regime type.  Chart 5.2 reflects the percentage of respondents in each country who, in response 
to the same question used for democratic support, chose instead that they would support an 
authoritarian regime under some circumstances.  Other possible response options were 
indifference to regime type, “don’t know” or “didn’t answer.” As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, low democratic support does not always translate into high authoritarian support.   
 Consistent with levels of support for democracy, Chart 5.2 reveals slightly lower support 
for authoritarianism in Nicaragua compared to other countries in the region.  Nicaragua’s levels 
of authoritarian support across this period average 12% compared with 13.6% in El Salvador, 
14% in Honduras and 22.2% in Guatemala.  However, this difference is even less pronounced 
than the differences in democratic support.  Again, there is significant variance over time and 
Nicaragua is not always the country with the lowest authoritarian support.  Interestingly, 
authoritarian support appears to be much more volatile than democratic support suggesting that it 
may, in some cases, represent a response to a difficult situation rather than a more entrenched 
idea, as democratic support appears to be.  Still, there are significant differences between these 
countries that form trends rather than one-off events.  Over this period, support for 
authoritarianism in Guatemala remains the highest in the region. 
 Returning to a comparative analysis of Guatemala and Nicaragua, there does appear to be 
higher general support for democracy in the latter, likely a result of the experience of revolution.  
This is also true of authoritarian support, the subject of this investigation, but the effect is slight 
(especially with respect to other regional countries).  The fact that Guatemala remains an outlier 
suggests that the experience of revolution is only a small part of the explanation for the 
differences in authoritarian support between the two countries.  Another variable that may help 
explain this puzzle is the differing effect of inequality in each country. 
 Chart 5.2: Authoritarian Support in Central America
Source: Latinobarómetro 2011 
 
Inequality 
 Chapter 2 identified a trend towards countries with greater inequality having higher levels 
of authoritarian support.  Some of the data se
Boix’s assertion that unequal distribution of wealth in a country will drive some to violate the 
rules of the democratic game.  In 
established elite would prefer authoritarian rule as a means to preserve their wealth.  We may be 
able to gain greater insight into this proposition, and whether it relates to the two countries under 
investigation here, by looking at the way
 Guatemala is slightly more unequal than 
index compared with the latter’s 45.7.
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 that different social classes feel about authoritarian rule.
Nicaragua; the former scored 52.4 on the GINI 
67
  Still, these countries both demonstrate fairly high levels 





 of inequality.  However, Chart 5.3 shows that the effect of 
slightly different between the two countries
1-10, with 1 being the poorest and 10 being the richest.  
Chart 5.3: Authoritarian Support vs. Economic Class
In neither case does class appear to be the primary driver of support for authoritarianism.  
In Guatemala, levels of support for authoritarianism are fairly consistent across the different 
points on the scale of wealth.  The same is roughly true in Nicaragua, but here we can see a slight 
trend toward higher authoritarian support among the wealthier citizens.  Among the richest 
26.7% support the idea of an authoritarian regime, while the same is true o
poorest Nicaraguans.  This seems to offer some evidence for the idea that, in some cases, 
inequality can drive those who would be threatened by evening the playing field to support an 
authoritarian regime option in order to secure their
social class on authoritarian 
.  Class is measured by a self-reporting on a scale of 
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why authoritarian support is so much higher in Guatemala.  To continue to investigate this puzzle, 
we will next turn to each countries ethnic composition. 
Indigenous Population   
 Another important difference between Guatemala and Nicaragua is the presence of a 
significantly large indigenous community in the former compared to a relatively homogenous, 
mestizo population in the latter, with only a small, geographically isolated native population.  In 
Guatemala, indigenous people make up roughly half of the population.  In Nicaragua the 
proportion is closer to 5%.  To probe the extent to which these differing racial makeups 
contribute to regime legitimacy, tables 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate the relationship between 
ethnicity and support for authoritarianism in both countries.   
 Table 5.1 shows that respondents with Indigenous ethnic backgrounds were more likely 
than all other major ethnic groups to reject authoritarianism.  Only 19% of native Guatemalans 
were willing to accept some form of authoritarianism compared with 33.7% of Mestizos and 
23% of Whites.  In contrast to Guatemala, the pattern goes the other way in Nicaragua where 
Indigenous people tended to be more accepting of authoritarian rule.  Here, 21.7% of natives 
reported conditional preference for authoritarianism compared to 13.2% of Mestizos, 12.5% of 
Whites and 3.6% of Blacks.  Although these differences are small in both cases, they do appear 
to demonstrate important patterns in both cases.68   Support for authoritarianism in Guatemala 
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remains at concerning levels no matter your race.  These levels become much more concerning 
for non-indigenous Guatemalans.  Perhaps the question is not why indigenous groups are less 
supportive of authoritarianism, but rather why non-indigenous groups are more supportive of 
alternatives to democracy.  The explanation here may lie in patterns of racism that underlie 
Guatemalan politics.   
 Over, three-quarters of Guatemalans view their society as discriminatory toward the 
indigenous population.69  Unlike in Nicaragua, indigenous people, if united, could form a 
powerful political force if granted full participation rights.  It may not be a leap to think that a 
discriminatory environment combined with a potentially powerful yet suppressed population 
could lead some Guatemalans in the “in-group” (mestizo and white) to harbor reservations about 
the full inclusion that democracy entails.  A lack of comparable survey data on racist attitudes in 
Guatemala limits our ability to test this proposition but there may be some anecdotal evidence 
pointing in this direction.   
 As part of the ongoing Peace Accords following the end of the 30-year civil war, 
Guatemalans voted in a 1999 referendum including important provisions on indigenous 
recognition, rights and language usage.  In the context of incredibly low turnout, the referendum 
was rejected in a fairly close vote.  Close inspection of the election results reveals that by far the 
highest concentration of “No” votes was in urban and mestizo areas, while the “Yes” vote was 
more common in areas with higher concentrations of indigenous peoples.70  Among competing  
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Table 5.1: Guatemala 
Source: Latinobarómetro 
 
Table 5.2: Nicaragua 








24.3% 3.9% 21.7% 13.2% 17.6% 12.5% 
Doesn’t Matter 24.9% 31.5% 8.5% 18.9% 6.1% 22.1% 
Didn’t Answer - - 1.3% 1.0% 6.1% - 
Don’t Know 13.2% 11.1% 16.6% 14.2% - 7.5% 
(N) (8) (27) (81) (670) (17) (55) 
Source: Latinobarómetro 2011 
 
explanations for this phenomenon is a fear of change and even outright racism.  In a 1999 news 
article analyzing the results, Juan Hernandez Pico noted that in the debate in the media running 
up to the vote, “a large sector of the ladino population feared that the constitutional reforms 
would shift the balance of power in Guatemala, starting a dangerous trend by recognizing the 
majority status of the Mayan population and their cultural values, spirituality, common law and 








- 33.8% 19% 33.7% 33.5% 23% - 
Doesn’t Matter 65.4% 22.6% 28.9% 24.8% 33% 32.8% 34.7% 
Didn’t Answer - - 1.4% - - 0.7% - 
Don’t Know - 22.6% 13.2% 3.1 - 7.4% 16.6% 
(N) (3) (9) (450) (154) (6) (291) (6) 
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languages.”71  He points to a “hidden racism” that exists not in the form of overt discrimination 
but rather a convenient pattern of denial of full status and freedoms to indigenous people.   
While it is certainly possible that this kind of racism may contribute to higher levels of 
authoritarian support in Guatemala—and the experience of the referendum appears to back this 
thinking up—the lack of hard data prevents any solid conclusions.  In any case, the ethnic 
divisions in support for authoritarianism do appear relevant but still do not seem to capture the 
full story.  The final variable investigated below is the pervasive violence in Guatemala that does 
not reach comparable levels in Nicaragua. 
Violence and Crime 
 Violence and organized crime have become pervasive in Guatemala.  The murder rate in 
2010 was 42 per 100,000 citizens compared with 14 in Nicaragua.  Weak institutions and the 
legacy of the civil war have contributed to a sense of impunity in Guatemala as only 2% of 
crimes reported to the Public Ministry ever see their day in court.72  As Guatemalans lose faith in 
the ability of their government to protect their security, they could well be expected to embrace 
authoritarian solutions that would at least bring calm.  The election of Conservative President 
Otto Pérez Molina can be seen as a step in this direction.73  Molina ran against a leftist 
incumbent in 2012 promising a return to mano dura, or iron fist, politics in order to get the 
escalating violence under control.  Additionally, high levels of military support in Guatemala 
may reflect a willingness to accept a military solution to these systemic problems. 
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 There is indeed some scholarly evidence that the kind of criminal violence that exists in 
Guatemala—but is much less present in Nicaragua—negatively impacts regime legitimacy.74  
For example, using LAPOP survey data, Miguel Carreras finds that both crime victimization and 
perceptions of criminal violence lead to lower system support.  He notes, as suggested above, 
that this disenchantment may promote support for authoritarian solutions.  Using 
Latinobarómetro data, Chart 5.4 examines this idea in Nicaragua and Guatemala.  It 
demonstrates that, in Guatemala, the more concerned an individual is about being a victim of a 
violent crime, the more likely they are to support the idea of an authoritarian regime.  Only 
16.7% of those who never feel threatened would support authoritarianism under some 
circumstances compared with 26.6% of those who feel threatened all or almost all of the time.   
Interestingly, Nicaragua displays the reverse pattern with individuals that feel more secure 
actually being slightly more likely to support authoritarianism.  These findings offer some 
support to the idea that the pervasive nature of violence in Guatemala makes it an important 
factor in the determination of regime support.  The same cannot be said for Nicaragua where 
violence has not penetrated daily life to the same degree.   
 Related to the widespread violence in Guatemala is the issue of increasing penetration of 
the state’s institutions by drug traffickers and organized criminal syndicates.  Large-scale 
government scandals in Guatemala often have undertones of this kind of penetration, a situation 
not so visible in Nicaragua.  For example, the February 2007 killing of three Salvadoran 
representatives to the Central American Parliament was eventually traced to a Guatemalan  
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 Chart 5.4: Crime and Authoritarian Support
Source: Latinobarómetro 2011 
 
 
politician and four Guatemalan policemen including the head of the organized
Additionally, in 2005, the head of the anti
charges of drug trafficking.76  Notably, this event corresponds with a massive jump in 
authoritarian support in the country between 2005 and 2006 that can be ob
Although Nicaragua is no stranger to high
the absence of the pronounced criminal organizations found in Guatemala makes allegations 
perhaps less damning in the former.  Chart 5.5
citizens perceive corruption in both countries.
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 Chart 5.5: Corruption and Authoritarian Support
Source: Latinobarómetro 2011 
 The findings are quite clear: those who have heard of an act of corruption in Guatema
are almost three times more likely to support authoritarianism than those who have not.  In 
Nicaragua, the reverse is true but the effect is much smaller.  I would argue that this is due to the 
differing nature of corruption in the two countries.  Corru
demonstrate deeply concerning links between the government and criminal groups
form of organized crime.  The fact that criminal violence is a central concern in Guatemala 
makes this situation even worse.  How can the
pressing issues in the country if they are colluding with the enemy?  In Nicaragua, corruption 
may demonstrate government greed, incompetence, trickery and theft, but it does not present an 
immediate threat to citizens in the same way that it does in Guatemala.  The persistence of 
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violence and the apparent government complicity in it in Guatemala may offer the best 
explanation yet for its differing levels of authoritarian support. 
Conclusions 
 Despite many similarities, Guatemala and Nicaragua display consistently different levels 
of authoritarian support.  Guatemalans appear much more open to some form of authoritarian 
rule than their Nicaraguan counterparts.  Explanations pursued in previous chapters offer little 
help in explaining this variance as both countries share similar political regimes and 
socioeconomic conditions.  Both countries have also seen a decrease in repression under 
nominally democratic institutions.  In explaining regime support in these two countries, we are 
forced to look outside of the mold laid out in the literature. 
 The historical experience of social revolution in Nicaragua seems to have elevated 
democratic support in that country thereby slightly diminishing authoritarian support.  
Nicaragua’s homogenous mestizo population may also contribute to its comparatively low levels 
of authoritarian support.  In Guatemala, where native populations make up around half of the 
population, non-indigenous racial groups appear more supportive of authoritarian alternatives.  
This may be due in part to xenophobia and even racist fears of allowing a historically 
marginalized group into power by fully embracing democracy.  This analysis found anecdotal 
evidence to support this proposition but the limitations of the survey data available prevent a 
closer analysis.  Class differences do not appear to drive a similar fear of capture of the system 
by the masses in Guatemala, although wealthier individuals in Nicaragua tend to demonstrate 
slightly higher authoritarian support.  Finally, Guatemala’s higher levels of violence and patterns 
of government collusion with criminals appear to play a part in fostering support for 
authoritarian solutions where democracy has failed. 
 108
 In general, it is clear that support for authoritarianism has multifaceted explanations.  
There is unlikely to be any one-size fits all explanation and there even appears to be significant 
variation in explanations across different countries.  This suggests that debates between global or 
regional analysis of regime support may be somewhat misplaced.  A smaller-scale investigation 
of individual countries appear to be the best way to proceed when looking to explain trends in 
support for authoritarianism.  This investigation seems to have revealed that finding issues that 
are of particular importance to or cause significant contention among the population (like public 
security and indigenous rights in Guatemala) may be the best way to root out the causes of 



















Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 This thesis sought to explain varying levels of authoritarian support across many new (or 
relatively new) democracies.  I uncovered that levels of authoritarianism vary widely across 
Latin America, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe.  Looking closer at support for specific 
authoritarian alternatives reveals even starker differences.   
 Support for authoritarianism is the comparatively understudied flip side of democratic 
legitimacy.  For this investigation, I took the fairly wide-reaching literature on democratic 
support and attempted to apply it to the more peculiar condition of authoritarian support.  This 
was aimed at confirming previous research, attempting to add my own insights, and seeing to 
what degree these two measures of popular support are actually related.   
 I have found significant variation in the triggers of authoritarian support across different 
regions.  Therefore, while the structure of this thesis was divided by particular issues (political, 
economic and cultural), this conclusion will be broken down by region.  In this chapter, I will 
describe my main findings for Latin America, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe.  I will then 
illuminate some overarching trends.  Stepping back to look at this research as a whole I find two 
important insights that could help guide future studies of regime support.  First, authoritarian 
support should be viewed as distinct from democratic support.  High support for democracy can 
sometimes be deceiving and low support for democracy can indicate indifference rather than 
acceptance of authoritarian institutions.  Second, authoritarian support seems to be best analyzed 
at a smaller scale, looking at the unique contexts of individual countries. 
Latin America 
 In Latin America, politics seem to take priority over economics in determining support 
for authoritarianism.  Still, some aspects of modernization appear to be relevant.  Urbanization 
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and increasing education are linked to decreasing support for authoritarian alternatives.  These 
processes may introduce democratic values or perhaps help prevent charismatic autocrats from 
taking advantage of a more widely spread, less educated population.  Inequality and poverty may 
contribute to support for autocracy as well but, particularly with respect to inequality, the 
evidence is contradictory.  Although countries identified as being more unequal by the GINI 
index tend to have higher levels of popular authoritarian support, this is not mediated through 
individuals’ perceptions of wealth distribution.  It remains possible that some intervening factor 
is behind this.  Future studies could investigate related issues like land distribution or elite-level 
corruption. 
 While many deeper economic conditions seemed at least partially relevant to 
authoritarian support in Latin America, shorter-term evaluations of economic conditions were 
not as important.  This seems to indicate that economic downturn is not likely to result in large 
portions of the population of Latin American countries jumping ship and shifting their loyalty to 
authoritarian alternatives.  This study stopped short of investigating whether deep, prolonged 
economic crisis might have that result. 
 Various measures of the political system in Latin America tended to be better predictors 
of regime support than shorter-term economic factors.  General evaluations of democracy’s 
progress and levels of satisfaction with how democracy is working were significantly connected 
to support for authoritarianism.  More specifically, high levels of corruption are consistently 
connected with support for autocracy. These correlations were generally stronger than those 
found for economic measures but they were still notably small and left the question of 
authoritarian support only partially answered. 
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 An important finding in Latin America was that a history of repression, especially when 
the new democratic regime is seen as an improvement over the past, is associated with greater 
rejection of authoritarianism.  Many in the region seem to have learned the historical lesson and 
do not desire that the country end up in a similar situation again.  This returns us to the notion, 
highlighted more than a decade ago by Richard Rose and his colleagues, that authoritarian 
alternatives are evaluated with respect to familiar forms of government.  This seems to imply that 
citizens have concrete associations with different forms of authoritarian rule rather than some 
abstract idealized picture.   
Although it is merely speculation, some of the other major findings for the region could 
be interpreted through this lens.  For example, if corruption levels are seen as having increased 
under democratic rule (a system where there are more “palms to grease”), then authoritarianism 
may be seen as comparatively clean form of rule, even if this might not really be the case.  As 
another example, the effect of inequality on authoritarian support could be related to a perception 
that land reform is difficult under a democratic regime.  This framework opens up many 
interesting lines of study that could continue to uncover the sources of authoritarian support in 
this region.   
Africa 
 Demonstrating the very real differences between these three regions, this thesis has all 
but failed to solve the puzzle of authoritarian support in Africa.  Neither economic nor political 
factors explained more than a miniscule amount of variance in support for autocracy.  Culture 
was equally inconclusive, showing in some cases the opposite of the expected effect on regime 
support. 
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 Still, the very unpredictability of authoritarian legitimacy in this region is fascinating.  
Why is Africa so resistant to the same factors that are turning populations toward autocrats and 
military rule in other regions?  Perhaps applying a similar framework to the one enumerated 
above for Latin America could bear interesting results in Africa.  This might involve looking 
closer at the nature of past authoritarian regimes in the region to see what conditions might 
dissuade populations from considering a return to that system of rule.   
Another framework that has been used in the past for tackling the puzzle of authoritarian 
support in Africa involves looking at each country on a case-by-case basis.  Michael Bratton, 
Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi exemplify this method in their analysis of regime support in 
Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa.  As an example, they attribute high 
support for one-party rule in Lesotho to a perceived association between multiparty competition 
and political violence.  In Tanzania, this same condition is explained by popular loyalty to a 
charismatic political leader pushing the one-party agenda.  I believe my findings in the previous 
two chapters are in agreement with this framework and show that getting up close to each 
country in this way might be the best available method to discover the roots of regime support.  
Central and Eastern Europe 
 While it is hard to generalize for Central and Eastern Europe given the small number of 
cases analyzed, there are some distinct trends in the region.  Both economic and political 
variables seemed somewhat relevant to explaining authoritarian support in this region.  The two 
countries with higher popular authoritarian support were characterized by struggling economies 
(lower GDP growth and higher inflation).  Level of education seems to be an important factor as 
well.  Objective and subjective measures confirmed that poverty may be driving some in this 
region toward authoritarian alternatives. 
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 Turning to politics, support for strongman rule was closely predicted by perceptions that 
rights are not respected and that elections are corrupt.  This offered some of the strongest 
evidence that evaluations of the functioning of democracy can cause support for non-democratic 
alternatives in some cases.  The effect of culture was unclear at the regional level but further 
analysis in Chapter 5 revealed that many in this region (especially in Romania and Ukraine) see 
both strongman rule and democracy as acceptable.  Emancipative values revealed that Ukrainian 
culture might be more similar to Russia than Europe. 
Overarching Themes 
 One major finding of this thesis is that authoritarian support may be best observed as 
distinct from democratic support.  One reason for this, demonstrated in Chapter 3, is that a drop 
in support for democracy can simply mean increasing indifference.  Poor political conditions in 
particular seem to drive indifference to a greater degree than approval of non-democratic 
alternatives.  Support for authoritarianism is a comparatively extreme option and seems to have 
somewhat distinct sources.  Additionally, the case of Ukraine in Chapter 5 demonstrated that 
sometimes support for democracy and support for authoritarianism can coexist without being 
seen as contradictory.  This means that the nearly universal support for democracy in general 
across the world is likely deceiving.   
 Another key finding relates to the level of analysis most appropriate for studying support 
for authoritarian regime alternatives.  This thesis found that different regions, and even different 
countries, had distinct sources of support for military rule, strong man rule and autocratic rule in 
general.  The cases observed in Chapter 6 serve as an example of two countries that could not be 
explained by the traditional framework looking at economics, politics, culture or even history.  In 
this case, the high levels of authoritarian support had more to do with the unique environment of 
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violence, insecurity and corruption that pervades Guatemala.  In Central and Eastern Europe, the 
strong effect of political evaluations on support for strongman rule was completely absent in 
Ukraine, where it seems that a hidden cultural bent was responsible for the widespread support 
for this authoritarian option.  If these two cases were best observed at the country-level, there is 
good reason to think that other cases will be as well.  It makes sense to investigate the issues that 
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